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I. INTRODUCTION
The statement that history repeats itself may be a clich6, but like
many cliches, it contains some truth. Students of military and political
history quickly discern certain issues pertaining to their subjects which
recur cyclically. Students of constitutional law do so as well. One of the
recurring issues in American constitutional law concerns the allocation
of governmental authority between the federal government and the fifty
states. As Woodrow Wilson once explained, the debate over federalism
continually arises because "it is a question of growth, and every succes-
sive stage of our political and economic development gives it a new as-
pect, and makes it a new question."'
Today, many Americans are seriously questioning the New Deal
philosophy which produced an activist federal government with broad
regulatory powers and the bureaucracy that accompanies it. As the con-
sensus supporting an activist national government has eroded, a vigorous
political debate has ensued regarding the proper allocation of authority
between the states and the federal government. While the political as-
pects of this debate will be settled at the polls in future congressional and
presidential elections, its constitutional aspects are currently being
thrashed out in the opinions of a deeply divided Supreme Court.2
Throughout the history of American constitutional law, challenges
to the authority of Congress to legislate under the Commerce Clause
have provided the real battleground for disputes over the balance of
power between the federal government and the states.3 During the 1995
Supreme Court term, it became clear that a majority of the Justices felt
that the federal balance had tilted too far in favor of Capitol Hill. Conse-
1 Marcia Coyle, Washington Gets Amendment Fever, NAT'. L.J., June 5, 1995, at Al.
2 Joan Biskupic, Tests of Federal Power Are Prominent on Supreme Court's Docket,
WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1995, at A6.
3 GEOFFREY R. STONE Er AL., CONsTruTIONAL LAW 151-52 (1991).
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quently, for the first time in sixty years, the Court invalidated a Congres-
sional attempt to legislate under the Commerce Clause in United States v.
Lopez.4 This landmark decision created considerable confusion in the
lower federal courts regarding the breadth of Congress's authority to leg-
islate pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Some federal judges interpreted
Lopez as the beginning of an offensive aimed at rolling back the vast
regulatory authority the government had accumulated since the Court re-
defined the federal balance during the New Deal.5 Other federal judges
interpreted the opinion as establishing a clear limit on the previously un-
limited commerce power, which would prevent Congress from further
regulating areas of traditional state concern (e.g., education, family law,
and criminal law) via the Commerce Clause.6 Still other members of the
federal bench felt that Lopez was limited to its facts and posed no obsta-
cle to the expansion of Congress's authority to regulate private conduct
pursuant to the Commerce Clause.7 The larger debate over the scope of
the commerce power after Lopez spawned several smaller debates over
whether particular pieces of legislation premised upon the commerce
power were still constitutional.
The purpose of this Note is to illuminate one of these smaller de-
bates centering around the Federal Child Support Recovery Act of 1992
(CSRA) by analyzing the arguments for and against the validity of the
CSRA. Part II of the Note explains the CSRA and shows how the Lopez
decision encouraged constitutional attacks on the Act. Part I of the
Note traces the development of the debate over the CSRA by describing
the earliest challenges to the CSRA and the arguments offered in those
cases which, notably, have been repeated in all subsequent challenges to
the CSRA. Part IV analyzes the rationales used by courts during this
debate to hold the CSRA unconstitutional and finds that most of these
rationales possess little merit. To assess the one formidable argument in
favor of invalidating the CSRA, the Note devotes the majority of its anal-
ysis to discussing the larger debate concerning the scope of Congress's
commerce power after Lopez. The analysis attempts to explain where the
current boundary of the commerce power lies by placing Lopez in its
historical context. Ultimately, the Note concludes that federal courts
hearing CSRA challenges have misconstrued Lopez, causing most of
4 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (declaring the Gun Free School Zones Act unconstitutional as
exceeding congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce). The last time the Court
invalidated congressional legislation premised upon the Commerce Clause was in 1936. See
Carter v. Carter Cdal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (declaring the Bituminous Coal Conservation
Act of 1935 unconstitutional).
5 See infra Part IV.C.2.b.
6 See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 837-38 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (declaring
the CSRA unconstitutional).
7 See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995) (upholding the federal
car-jacking statute against Lopez challenge).
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them to erroneously conclude that the CSRA is a constitutional assertion
of the commerce power. The Note's analysis also suggests that courts
reaching the correct result may be doing so for the wrong reason due to
errors in translating the subtle but important message of Lopez.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE CSRA: WHAT IT DOES AND WHY IT WAS ENACTED
In 1992, George Bush signed the Child Support Recovery Act into
law. 8 The Act addresses the growing problem of collecting child support
payments across state lines by imposing federal criminal sanctions for
intentional failure to pay past due support obligations for a child residing
in another state.9 The CSRA permits a maximum fine10 of $5,00011 and
a jail term of six months for first-time offenders.' 2 Repeat offenders may
be imprisoned for two years 13 and fined 14 $250,000.15 All offenders con-
victed under the CSRA must make restitution "in an amount equal to the
past due support obligation as it exists at the time of sentencing."' 6
The CSRA does not, however, re-institute some form of debtor's
prison. The willfulness requirement in the statute 17 forces the govern-
ment to:
[E]stablish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that at the time
payment was due the [defendant] possessed sufficient
funds to enable him to meet his obligation or that the
lack of sufficient funds on such date was created by (or
was the result of) a voluntary and intentional act without
justification in view of all of the financial
circumstances. 18
Thus, Congress deemed the CSRA an appropriate response to two related
problems-the rising cost of federal welfare programs 19 and the increas-
8 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994).
9 Id.
10 Id. at § 228(b)(1).
11 H.R. REP. No. 102-771, at 4 (1992).
12 Id.
13 18 U.S.C. § 228(b)(2) (1994).
14 Id.
15 H.R. REP. No. 102-771, supra note 11, at 1.
16 18 U.S.C. § 228(c) (1994).
17 Id. at § 228(a).
18 H.R. REP. No. 102-77 1, supra note 11, at 7 (quoting United States v. Poll, 521 F.2d
329, 333 (9th Cir. 1975)). Courts have interpreted the willfulness requirement of the CSRA in
accordance with this congressional guidance. Therefore, inability to pay and lack of notice of
legal duty constitute defenses to a CSRA prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 936 F.
Supp. 1093, 1102-03 (D.R.I. 1996).
19 See generally, U.S. GENERAL AccoUNTING OFFcE, Child Support Enforcement:
Timely Action Needed To Correct System Development Problems, GAO/IMEC-92-46 (1992)
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ing gap between the amount of child support owed and the amount actu-
ally paid.20
In 1992, this gap was estimated to be $27 billion,21 up from an
estimated $5 billion in 1989.22 When supporting parents fail to pay their
child support obligations, custodial parents are more likely to seek assist-
ance from federal welfare programs, the AFDC 23 program in particular.24
Therefore, increases in the amount of unpaid child support cause corre-
sponding increases in federal payments to custodial parents. 25
As a policy matter, and notwithstanding federalism concerns, the
challenge of collecting child support across state lines to ensure that the
burden of supporting children falls "where it belongs"2 6 seems an appro-
priate topic for federal criminal legislation, even by the standards of
commentators critical of the "federalization" of criminal law.27 Accord-
(connecting unpaid child support obligations to the increasing costs of certain federal welfare
programs).
20 H.R. REP. No. 102-771, supra note 11, at 5-7.
21 Janelle T. Calhoun, Note, Interstate Child Support Enforcement System: Juggernaut
of Bureaucracy, 46 MERCER L. REv. 921, 922 (1995).
22 H.R. REP. No. 102-771, supra note 11, at 6.
23 Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was established by the Federal
Government in 1935 "for the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children ... by
enabling each state to furnish financial assistance ... to needy children." 42 U.S.C. § 601
(1994). Since 1975, federal expenditures to support needy children have increased from $5
billion to $12.7 billion. During the same period, state expenditures have risen from $4 billion
to $10.5 billion. See Calhoun, supra note 21, at 922 (this Note is an invaluable source for
anyone trying to understand the history and scope of America's child support crisis; it also
discusses several proposed solutions).
24 H.R. REP. No. 102-771, supra note 11, at 6.
25 Id. See also Editorial, Parents Who Don't Pay, ST. Louis DISPATCI, July 23, 1994, at
14B.
26 Speaking in support of Congress's first attempt to solve the problems associated with
collecting interstate child support, Senator Long of Louisiana summarized the problem:
Should our welfare system be made to support the children whose father cavalierly aban-
dons them or chooses not to marry the mother in the first place? Is it fair to ask the American
taxpayer who works hard to support his own family and to carry his burden to carry the burden
of the deserting father as well? Perhaps we cannot stop the father from abandoning his chil-
dren, but we can certainly improve the system by obtaining child support from him and
thereby place the burden of caring for his children on his own shoulders where it belongs. We
can, and we must, take the financial reward out of desertion.
118 CONG. REc. 8291 (1975).
27 See Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some Thoughts on
Saving the Federal Judiciary from the Federalization of State Crime, 43 KAN. L. REv. 503
(1995). Mengler describes four circumstances which militate in favor of federal criminal juris-
diction. One circumstance favoring "federalization" of a crime arises when "[t]he conduct is
serious (identified perhaps by some monetary minimum, if, for example, the injury can easily
be measured in those terms) and state enforcement is impeded by the multi-state or interna-
tional aspects of the crime." Id. at 526. See also Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few;
New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTn'iGs L.J. 979,
986 (1995).
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ing to a 1992 General Accounting Office (GAO) report,2 roughly one-
third of child support cases involve supporting and custodial parents liv-
ing in different states.29 Although every state "has some form of 'long
arm statute' designed to reach out and exercise jurisdiction over an ab-
sent noncustodial parent who fails to make court ordered child support
payments," 30 efforts to establish personal jurisdiction over out-of-state
"deadbeat" parents under these statutes sometimes violate due process.
The case of Kulko v. Superior Court31 illustrates this problem. In
Kulko, a custodial parent living in California attempted to sue her former
husband, then residing in New York, for child support.32 The United
States Supreme Court reversed the California Supreme Court's decision
granting a California trial court personal jurisdiction over Mr. Kulko.33
Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, held that although the defend-
ant's former wife and the children he was obligated to support lived in
California, there was not "a sufficient connection between the defendant
and the forum State as to make it fair to require defense of the action in
the forum [state]." '34
Of course, it may appear that custodial parents in Ms. Kulko's posi-
tion could avoid the difficulties of obtaining personal jurisdiction in an-
other state by filing an action in the state where the supporting parent
resides. This solution, however, ignores what Congress explicitly noted
during its deliberations on the CSRA-many single, female custodial
parents are rather impecunious.35 Thus, the costs of filing and maintain-
ing an in-state action can be prohibitive to single parents.36 The addi-
tional costs associated with maintaining an out-of-state suit are even
28 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Interstate Child Support: Mothers Report Receiv-
ing Less Support From Out-of-State Fathers, GAO/HRD-92-39FS (1992) (cited by H.R. RE,.
No. 102-771, supra note 11, at 5).
29 Id.
30 Calhoun, supra note 21, at 924.
31 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
32 Id. at 86-88.
33 Id. at 90.
34 Id. at 91 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1940)).
35 In 1989, 3.2 million families with children from an absent father lived below the gov-
ernment's official poverty line. H.R. REP. No. 102-771, supra note 11, at 5. "In a majority of
divorces, custodial mothers face a serious financial crisis while the noncustodial father's lifes-
tyle improves markedly." Calhoun, supra note 21, at 1. See generally Lenore J. Weitzman,
The Economic Consequences of Divorce: An Empirical Study of Property, Alimony, and Child
Support Awards, 8 FAM. L. REP. 4037 (1982) (providing a detailed analysis of the sharp de-
cline in the standard of living that custodial mothers and their children often experience after a
divorce).
36 For a good discussion of the financial burden lawyers, court costs, and fees impose on
these parents, see Paula Roberts, The Case for Fundamental Child Support Reform, 13
FAiR$HARE 8 (1993).
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more daunting.37 Furthermore, efforts to encourage states to pursue
"deadbeats" owing support to residents of another state have failed.38
After hearing extensive testimony to this effect, Congress took action to
alleviate the problems associated with collecting child support payments
across state lines. 39
When Congress moved to enact the CSRA, it heard many policy-
oriented objections to the proposed legislation. Some critics viewed the
CSRA as redundant criminal legislation40 because it addressed a matter
already covered by almost every state.41 Others branded the CSRA a
coercive measure to perpetuate a child support system that includes a
hidden margin of spousal maintenance as high as 50 percent.42 But in
1992, no one discussed whether or not Congress had the authority to
enact the CSRA. Nevertheless, in the summer of 1995, United States
District Judge Rosenblatt of the District of Arizona held43 that the CSRA
was "an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional power."44 Con-
gress's failure to consider constitutional challenges to the CSRA in 1992
is, nevertheless, understandable since attacks on Congress's authority to
regulate private behavior under the Commerce Clause were futile until a
landmark decision in the spring of 1995. 45
37 These additional expenses include hiring local counsel and the increased transaction
costs of communicating with and monitoring out-of-state counsel. Anyone with knowledge of
law firm billing knows who pays for a New York attorney's long distance calls to update his
California client. Such costs do not come out of the pockets of attorneys attempting to pay off
their student loans.
38 Harry B. O'Donnell, The Quest for Effective National Child Support Enforcement
Continues, 29 J. FAM. L. 149, 164-66 (1990).
39 H.R. REP. No. 102-771, supra note 11, at 5-6.
40 Mengler, supra note 27, at 504 (arguing that increased political interest in crime pre-
vention and punishment has lead to improper redundancy between federal and state criminal
justice systems).
41 Forty-two states have made willful failure to pay child support a crime, and many
impose stiffer sentences than the CSRA. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 11.51.120 (Michie 1996);
ARmZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2458 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West
1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-304 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 856.04 (West 1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-401 (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3605- (1993 &
Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:74 (West 1986 & Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-5-621 (1995); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.21 (Anderson 1996); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 163.555 (1993); Tjx. PNAL CODE ANN. § 25.05 (West 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 948.22
(West 1996).
Furthermore, all fifty states have adopted some form of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforce-
ment of Support Act (URESA). URESA was promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform States Laws to facilitate extradition of custodial parents in arrears
on support payments. See Calhoun, supra note 21, at 926-28. For an analysis of why URESA
never solved the problem, see O'Donnell, supra note 38, at 166.
42 Calhoun, supra note 21, at 952-54.
43 The case was United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 95
F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996).
44 Id. at 1362.
45 See infra Part IV.C.2.c.
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B. A LANDMARK DECISION PROVIDES A BASIS FOR CHALLENGING
LEGISLATION PREMISED UPON THE COMMERCE POWER
The landmark 46 decision was United States v. Lopez.47 Lopez in-
volved a challenge to the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zones
Act (GFSZA). 48 The GFSZA "made it a federal offense 'for any individ-
ual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows,
or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."' 49 The challenge
was brought on behalf of a twelfth grade high school student from San
Antonio, Texas charged with carrying a concealed handgun and ammuni-
tion on a school campus.50 Lopez appeared51 to identify "three broad
categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce
power:"
' 5 2
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of
interstate commerce .... Second, Congress is empow-
ered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities .... Finally, Congress's commerce
authority includes the power to regulate those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.5 3
46 Some scholars and judges have tried to downplay the significance of Lopez. One court
remarked that "the winds have not shifted that much." United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569,
590 (3rd Cir. 1995) (2-1 decision) (rejecting a Lopez challenge and upholding the constitution-
ality of the federal car-jacking statute). "There is just much less here than meets the eye."
Harvey Berkman, Second Commerce Clause Ruling Calms Waters, NAT'L L. J. May 15, 1995,
at A7 (quoting Professor Laurence Tribe on the significance of Lopez).
These characterizations of Lopez are questionable. Lopez certainly is a "watershed."
Bishop, 66 F.3d at 603 (Becker, J., dissenting). This is true simply because Lopez "found
some limitation on Congress's virtually unbounded power to legislate under the Commerce
Clause" for the first time in sixty years. Mengler, supra note 27, at 504. It is no longer the
"Hey, you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like Clause." Judge Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Vol-
ume Nineteen, 19 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 1, 5 (1995). Furthermore, since it came down, Lopez
has served as the basis for constitutional challenges to other exercises of federal power under
the Commerce Clause. See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
47 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (declaring the Federal Gun Free School Zone Act unconstitu-
tional on the grounds that it was beyond Congress's power to enact pursuant to the Commerce
Clause).
48 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V).
49 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(q)(1)(A) (1988)). The statute at issue defined "school zone" as "in, or on the grounds of
a public, parochial or private school" or "within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a
public, parochial or private school." 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25) (1988).
50 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
51 I use the word "appeared" because, as will be explained later, the Lopez majority's
holding, and the test it articulated, is more complex than this discussion of Lopez may indicate
at first blush. See infra Part IV.C.3-4.
52 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971)).
53 Id. at 1629-30.
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Applying this three-pronged test, the Court quickly concluded that
the GFSZA could not be upheld as a regulation of either the channels or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce and could only be sustained if it
regulated "an activit[y] that substantially affect[s] interstate com-
merce."' 54 After a lengthy analysis,55 the Court concluded that the GF-
SZA could not be upheld on this ground and affirmed the Fifth Circuit's
decision 56 holding the statute "invalid as beyond the power of Congress
under the Commerce Clause. 57
After Lopez, attorneys defending federal criminal prosecutions at-
tempted to defend their clients by using Lopez to attack the constitution-
ality of various federal criminal statutes enacted pursuant to the
Commerce Clause. This resulted in Lopez-based challenges to federal
statutes criminalizing car-jacking,5 8 possession of firearms and ammuni-
tion by convicted felons, 59 illegal sale and transportation of machine
guns, 60 arson,61 blocking abortion clinic access, 62 dealing in firearms
without a license,63 distribution of methamphetamines, 64 the Drug Free
School Zones Act,65 the Federal Child Support Recovery Act,66 and an
54 Id. at 1630 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968)).
55 The Court's analysis is discussed in detail infra Part IV.C.3-4.
56 United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993).
57 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
58 See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3rd Cir. 1995); United States v. Robin-
son, 62 F.3d 234 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Carolina, 61 F.3d 917 (10th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947
(8th Cir. 1995). All of these courts rejected Lopez-type challenges.
59 See, e.g., United States v. Rankin, 14 F.3d 338 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Shelton, 66 F.3d 991 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379 (9th Cir. 1995).
All of these courts rejected Lopez challenges.
60 See, e.g., United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518 (10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting Lopez
challenge).
61 See, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v.
Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding, in light of Lopez, that convicting the
defendant on the facts of this particular case would be unconstitutional).
62 See, e.g., Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (lth Cir. 1995) (rejecting Lopez challenge);
United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (following the Fifth Circuit's
reasoning in Lopez, which the Supreme Court later affirmed, the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act was declared unconstitutional).
63 See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 897 F. Supp. 1500 (D. Conn. 1995).
64 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 893 F. Supp. 935.(S.D. Cal. 1995).
65 See, e.g., United States v. Salmiento, 898 F. Supp. 45 (D.P.R. 1995); United States v.
Garcia-Salazar, 891 F. Supp. 568 (D. Kan. 1995).
66 United States v. Bongiomo, No. 96-1052, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2170 (lst Cir. Feb.
7, 1997) (upholding CSRA); United States v. Johnson, 940 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. Va. 1996)
(upholding CSRA); United States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1093 (D.R.I. 1996) (upholding
CSRA); United States v. Sims, 936 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Okla. 1996) (upholding CSRA); United
States v. Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. 1076 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (upholding CSRA); United States v.
Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (upholding CSRA); United States v. Collins, 921
F. Supp. 1028 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (upholding CSRA); United States v. Kegel, 916 F. Supp. 1233
(M.D. Fla. 1996) (upholding CSRA); United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (declaring CSRA unconstitutional); United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84 (D. Conn.
1997]
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assortment of other federal laws.67 The CSRA is one of a small number
of statutes that more than one federal district court has held to be an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress's commerce power in the wake of
Lopez.68
III. CHALLENGES TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
CSRA: THE DISTRICT COURTS SPLIT
A. AN INrriAL CONSENSUS UPHOLDS THE CSRA
The first five court challenges to the CSRA set out the general argu-
ments that defendants in all subsequent cases would use to challenge the
Act's constitutionality. These cases are worth reviewing because they
place the arguments against the CSRA in context and illustrate the debate
in the lower federal courts which is percolating up to the Appellate
Courts.
In United States v. Hampshire,69 the United States District Court of
Kansas rejected the first constitutional challenge to the CSRA. The de-
fense made several arguments. First, Hampshire's counsel contended
that, after Lopez, the CSRA was invalid because Congress did not have
authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the statute in the first
place.70 In rejecting this argument, the court analyzed the CSRA in light
of Lopez. It concluded that the CSRA was a constitutional exercise of
Congress's commerce power "because the requirement of an interstate
relationship is one of the explicit elements of the crime," 71 and it satisfies
the "substantially affecting commerce" requirement because, according
1995) (upholding CSRA), aff'd, 92 F.3d 101 (1996); United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727
(W.D. Tex. 1995) (declaring CSRA unconstitutional); United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp.
389 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (upholding CSRA); United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360 (D.
Ariz. 1995) (declaring CSRA unconstitutional), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787 (1996); United States v.
Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995) (declaring CSRA unconstitutional), rev'd, 95 F.3d
787 (1996); United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Va. 1995) (upholding CSRA),
vacated for improper venue, 934 F. Supp. 736 (1996); United States v. Hampshire, 892 F.
Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1995) (upholding CSRA), aff'd, 95 F.3d 999 (1996).
67 For a thoroughly exhaustive account of the range of federal statutes subjected to Lopez
challenges see United States v. Walls, 92 F.3d 1444, 1480-85 nn.53-63 (6th Cir. 1996) (Boggs,
J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (listing cases).
68 United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995); United States v. Bailey,
902 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
69 United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327, 1329 (D. Kan. 1995), aff'd, 95 F.3d
999 (1996). Mr. Hampshire's wife commenced divorce proceedings on October 4, 1986 while
he was in prison for being absent without leave (AWOL) from the U.S. Army. Mr. Hampshire
was served process for the divorce in prison and subsequently held in default. At the divorce
proceeding, the former Mrs. Hampshire was awarded custody of their child, and Mr. Hamp-
shire was ordered to pay $350.00 a month in child support. Mr. Hampshire subsequently fell
in arrears with his support obligation and, in December 1994, was prosecuted under the Child
Support Recovery Act.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1332.
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to Congressional findings in the CSRA, "failure to pay child support has
an effect on interstate commerce sufficient to comply with constitutional
requirements. ''72
The defense then argued that the CSRA violated the Tenth Amend-
ment and the "domestic relations exception" to federal court jurisdic-
tion.73 Citing New York v. United States74 and Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,75 the court rejected the Tenth Amendment
argument because "[t]he CSRA creates criminal sanctions for individuals
who fail to comply with child support obligations; it makes no attempt to
regulate the conduct of the states as states. '76 The court also found the
domestic relations exception argument meritless "because the domestic
relations exception is rooted in a narrow construction of the diversity
jurisdiction statute.... the rule has no application where there exists an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction beyond diversity of
citizenship. ' '77
Mr. Hampshire also tried to avoid prosecution under the CSRA
through the doctrine of abstention and the principle of federal-state com-
ity.7a These arguments did not impress the court. The judge failed to see
how prosecuting Hampshire "interferes with any state proceeding" and
noted that "there are no pending state proceedings" that would be dis-
rupted.79 With these words, it was clear that the first attack on the CSRA
had failed.
One month after Hampshire was decided, United States v. Murphy80
presented the second constitutional challenge to the CSRA. James Mur-
phy asserted that the CSRA, as it applied to him, violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause8' and generally exceeded Congress's authority under the
72 Id. at 1329.
73 Id. at 1330.
74 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) ( holding that "Congress may not simply commandeer the
legislative process of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal
regulatory program") (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., Inc.,
452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
75 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
76 United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (D. Kan. 1995).
77 Id.
78 Citing to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and Burfod v. Sun Oil, 319 U.S. 315
(1943), the Hampshire Court aptly summarized abstention as a federal court's discretionary
authority to "refuse to exercise jurisdiction in a matter which would disrupt the establishment
of coherent state policy... over matters traditionally reserved to states" and to prevent "inter-
fere[nce] with a pending state criminal prosecution." Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1331.
79 Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1331.
80 United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Va. 1995), vacated for improper
venue, 934 F. Supp. 736 (W.D. Va. 1996).
81 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Mr. Murphy had neglected to pay child support for his
daughter in Virginia since 1991. When the CSRA was passed on October 26, 1992, Murphy
already owed $5,099.49 in child support. He was subsequently notified that continued failure
to pay this past due support would result in federal criminal prosecution. After he continued to
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Commerce Clause.8 2 In a brief paragraph, the court dismissed Murphy's
ex post facto claim 83 and used the majority of its opinion to dispose of
Murphy's Commerce Clause argument. The court quickly distinguished
the CSRA from the statute held to be constitutionally infirm in Lopez on
the grounds that the CSRA, unlike the Gun Free School Zones Act, pos-
sesses a "jurisdictional element that ensures it will not intrude upon mat-
ters with no relation to interstate commerce. ' 84 The court explained that
the CSRA accomplishes this end by requiring the defendant to "be under
an obligation to transfer funds from one state to another" to support a
"child who resides in another state."' 85 Under the court's analysis, the
CSRA satisfied Lopez's "substantial relation to interstate commerce" 86
requirement because:
[I]n order to come under the purview of § 228, the ac-
cused will often have taken advantage of employment
opportunities in the state in which he lives, there can be
little argument that a requirement that he provide money
to a child in another state has a substantial effect on in-
terstate commerce.
87
The Murphy Court reasoned that, like 18 U.S.C. § 1073,88 and 18
U.S.C. § 1201,89 the CSRA (18 U.S.C. § 228) was a justified exercise of
the commerce power "to criminalize activity involving interstate
travel ... [in order to prevent] an individual from escaping either law
enforcement officers or his own legal obligations by taking advantage of
our federal system of government through flight to another state."90 The
court's Commerce Clause analysis ended with a citation to United States
neglect paying support, he was indicted under the CSRA. Murphy contended that the indict-
ment violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because "although he owed $5,099.49 on October 26,
1992 when the [the CSRA] was passed, he did not accumulate an arrearage sufficient to meet
the jurisdictional pre-requisite of $5,000 from the date of the act's passage until the termina-
tion date of the information ... June 30, 1993." Murphy, 893 F. Supp. at 615.
82 Murphy, 893 F. Supp. at 615.
83 The court found no violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause because Murphy "was put
on notice that he would be held criminally liable if he did not make the child support payments
then owing... [and] persisted in completely ignoring his obligation to pay child support." Id.
at 617. The court concluded that Murphy was "being punished solely for conduct which oc-
curred once he was on notice that such conduct exposed him to criminal liability under a
federal statute ... [so the] ex post facto clause does not prohibit punishment." Id.
84 Id. at 616.
85 Id.
86 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629-30 (1995).
87 Murphy, 893 F. Supp. at 616.
88 18 U.S.C. § 1073 permits federal prosecution for fleeing a state to avoid prosecution
or a legal compulsion to testify.
89 18 U.S.C. § 1201 creates federal criminal liability for anyone who "willfully" trans-
ports an abductee across state lines.
90 Murphy, 893 F. Supp. at 616.
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v. Hampshire9' and the conclusion that Lopez did not prevent Congress
from enacting legislation affecting the obligations that arise from family
relationships. 92 The opinions in Hampshire and Murphy, however, were
not cogent and forceful enough to convince all federal judges that the
CSRA was constitutional.
B. THiRD TIME'S THE CHARM: THE CSRA Is HELD TO BE
UNCONSTUTIoNAL
Eight days after United States v. Murphy was decided, United States
District Judge Rosenblatt in Arizona released his opinions93 in United
States v. Mussari94 and United States v. Schroeder.95 The decisions held
that the CSRA was "an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's power." 96
Specifically, the Mussari Court found that, under Lopez, the CSRA ex-
ceeded Congress's authority to legislate pursuant to the Commerce
Clause and therefore violated the limitations the Tenth Amendment
placed on this power.97 After summarizing Lopez and its three-part test,
the Mussari Court quickly concluded that the CSRA could only be justi-
fied under the third prong of Lopez-"[Activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce."981 The court, however, could not "find
that the CSRA bears a substantial relation to interstate commerce"99 and
proceeded with a litany of additional reasons for the conclusion that the
CSRA was unconstitutional.
91 892 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1995).
92 The Murphy Court stated:
While it may be true'that "family law has long been considered as coming under the
purview of state law," Lopez does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws aimed at
regulating the use of interstate travel as a means by which to avoid the legal obliga-
tions arising from family responsibilities.
Murphy, 893 F. Supp. at 617.
93 The opinions are literally identical except for the facts of each defendant's case on the
first page. An Arizona state court held Mr. Mussari, who lived in Illinois, to be $40,385.00 in
arrears on support payments to his wife and daughter in Arizona. The same court which held
Mr. Mussari to be in arrears found Mr. Schroeder, who also resided in Illinois, to be
$24,296.11 behind on payments to his wife for his child who also resided in Arizona.
By its docket number, Mussari was technically decided first. Because the opinions are
the same, except for the facts, this Note refers only to Mussari when discussing Judge Rosen-
blatt's rationale for striking down the CSRA. It is also interesting to note that both Mussari
and Schroeder were challenging the CSRA's constitutionality before Lopez came down and
were "given additional time in which to supplement their arguments in order to discuss the
Lopez decision." United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995). See also
United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360 (D. Ariz. 1995).
94 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995).
95 894 F. Supp. 360 (D. Ariz. 1995).
96 Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1361.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1363 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629-30 (1995)).
99 Id.
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The court rejected the government's contentions that the statute was
a permissible exercise of congressional power "because the non-payment
of child support substantially affects federal monies"'' ° and that the Act
was necessary to solve the "difficulties associated with extradition."' 0'1
The Mussari Court believed that accepting the government's arguments
would give Congress "carte blanche to criminalize any and all activities
in order to ensure that one state's laws were enforced ... [and] a finding
of such unlimited authority [was] rejected by the Supreme Court [in
Lopez]."o
The opinion raised additional objections to the CSRA as it contin-
ued its comparison of the CSRA to the statute in Lopez:
Just as there was no evidence in the Lopez decision that
the proscribed activity, i.e. possession of a firearm
within a school zone, involved interstate commerce,
neither is there evidence that the CSRA involves inter-
state commerce. There is no commercial intercourse in-
volved in the collection of delinquent child support
payments. 103
After drawing a commercial/noncommercial distinction, the court pro-
ceeded to describe the parade of horribles'0 4 it envisioned in the after-
math of courts accepting the premise that "the collection of debt [was]
sufficient to warrant federal criminal intervention."' 0 5
The opinion went on to declare that "[p]rinciples of federalism and
comity also support th[e] court's finding that the CSRA is unconstitu-
tional." 10 6 The court found no "clear statement"'1 7 of Congress's intent
to make the significant alteration in "the sensitive relation between fed-
eral and state criminal jurisdiction"'' 08 that would result from upholding
the CSRA.10 9 Furthermore, the CSRA violated comity because it "would
force federal courts to review and apply state court orders" 110 when de-
100 Id. at 1364.
101 Id. at 1365.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 1367.
104 The court feared that accepting the "debt collecting" rationale "would allow Congress
... to legislate in virtually any area. Even the collection of alimony payments could be subject
to Congressional scrutiny, despite the States' traditional role as overseeing matters related to
divorce and marriage." Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1368.
108 Id.
109 Whether or not the CSRA would actually affect a significant change in the federal-
state balance is open to question. See infra Part IV.C.
110 United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360, 1368 (D. Ariz. 1995). This very problem
has led some advocates of child support collection reform to propose having the federal gov-
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fendants challenged "the validity of the underlying state court support
order.""' Moreover, the Speedy Trial Act' 12 would make it difficult for
federal courts to "stay the pending federal criminal case while the sup-
port order is collaterally attacked in state court." 113
Because the court had already decided that Congress exceeded its
authority under the Constitution by enacting the statute, it followed that
the statute was "infringing upon those powers specifically reserved for
the States under the Tenth Amendment."' 14 Under the Mussari Court's
view of the Constitution, 15 the CSRA also violated the Tenth Amend-
ment because it was "an attempt to affect 'the lives liberties and proper-
ties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of
the State' 116 and . . . such regulation [was] within the purview of the
States." 117 In the entire opinion, the court never once mentioned either
of the decisions upholding the CSRA.
On September 7, 1995, it became clear that Mussari was not an
anomaly isolated to the District of Arizona. In United States v. Bailey,"18
Judge Biery of the San Antonio Division of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas, where United States v. Lopez
originated, 119 adopted the Mussari Court's position on the CSRA. In a
emnment take over the states' role in child support law, which would include the issuance of
federally mandated support decrees. See generally Roberts, supra note 36.
For a critique of the "federalization" of child support law, see Maurice A. Hartnett, I,
The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, 11 DEL. L. REv. 51 (1993).
111 Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1368.
112 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1994) (providing specific. time periods in which defendants
must be arraigned and brought to trial).
113 Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1368.
114 Id. at 1369.
115 Judge Rosenblatt's position that the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states primary
authority to pass measures affecting "the lives liberties and properties of the people and the
internal order, improvement and prosperity of the States," is consistent with the Framers' un-
derstanding of the federal balance. THE FEDERAUaST No. 45, at 293 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
Although Judge Rosenblatt's view of the Tenth Amendment comports with the Framers'
intent and does not make "much if not all of Article I, Section 8 [of the Constitu-
tion] . . . surplusage," United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1644 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring), it is not a view of the Tenth Amendment shared by a majority of the Supreme
Court. See infra Part IV.C.I.
116 The powers delegated to the federal government are few and defined. Those
which remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will
be exercised principally on external objects, such as war, peace, negotiation, and
foreign commerce; which, with the last power taxation will, for the most part, be
connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all objects
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and property of
the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
THE FEDERALisT No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
117 Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1369.
118 No. SA-95-CR-138, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13922 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 1995).
119 Judge Garcia of the San Antonio Division of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Texas upheld the Gun Free School Zones Act. The Fifth Circuit reversed this
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remarkably concise opinion120 that was later amended, 121 the govern-
ment's information against Keith Douglas Bailey for violating the CSRA
was dismissed on the grounds that the CSRA was unconstitutional. In
his amended opinion, Judge Biery grounded his conclusion that the
CSRA was unconstitutional in two arguments. First, "[a]ctual applica-
tion of the CSRA would force federal courts to review and apply orders
of state courts in violation of the principles of federalism and comity." 122
Second, the CSRA embroiled the federal courts in domestic relations
matters that the domestic relations exception forbid them from
entertaining. 123
Three weeks after Bailey,124 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Evansville Division, rendered its opinion on
the constitutionality of the CSRA in United States v. Hopper. 125 Hopper
is an interesting 126 and disturbing' 27 opinion. The Hopper Court dis-
decision. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (1993). This reversal of the District Court was
affirmed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
120 The full opinion was:
The Court has considered the defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Court finds
18 U.S.C. § 228 is unconstitutional. See United States v. Lopez, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626,
115 S.Ct. 1624, 1632 (1995); United States v. Mussari, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10806, No. CR95-009 PHX-PGR, 1995 WL 447266 at*7 (D. Ariz. July 26, 1995)
(Rosenblatt, J.) (18 U.S.C. § 228 declared unconstitutional). Defendant's motion is
GRANTED.
It is ORDERED that the information herein is DISMISSED.
United States v. Bailey, No. SA-95-CR-138, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13922 (W.D. Tex. Sept.
7, 1995).
121 United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
122 Id. at 729.
123 Id.
124 September 28, 1995, to be exact.
125 United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
126 The facts of Hopper are interesting because they demonstrate how the struggle of
custodial parents to collect child support is an ongoing, frustrating process. Mr. Hopper and
his wife were divorced in Indiana in 1978. The former Mrs. Hopper received custody of the
couple's son and was awarded $30 a week in child support at the time of the divorce. On June
3, 1993, the Vandenburgh, Indiana Superior Court found Mr. Hopper $18,670 in arrears on his
support payments, increased his support obligation to $75 a week, issued an Income Withheld
Order, and sentenced Hopper to one year in jail for contempt. A seemingly unrepentant Mr.
Hopper now faced prosecution under the CSRA for accruing $5,335 in arearages on his sup-
port obligation, despite the fact that he reported an income of $24,750 during 1992. Id. at 390-
91.
127 Hopper is a disturbing opinion because Magistrate Judge Hussman displayed an ex-
tremely poor understanding of the facts and reasoning of Lopez. In summarizing Lopez, Judge
Hussman stated that:
Although the GFA [Gun Free School Zones Act] specifically included congressional
findings and declarations concerning how the activity of gun possession in a school zone
substantially affected interstate commerce (see 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)), the language in the
statute which proscribed conduct did not explicitly require as an element of the crime any
nexus with interstate commerce .... and the possession of a firearm within a school zone
was too tenuous to justify Congress's intrusion into a matter of criminal law primarily of local
concern.
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cussed the Mussari Court's rationales for striking down the CSRA 128 and
the reasoning which the Hampshire and Murphy129 Courts relied upon in
upholding the statute. The Hopper Court "conclud[ed] that Murphy and
Hampshire [were] properly decided."' 130 The Hopper opinion echoed the
Murphy and Hampshire opinions by distinguishing the CSRA from the
GFSZA on the grounds that it limited the federal government's interest
to interstate cases in which there is failure to make. support payments to
"a child who resides in another state."'131 The court also rejected argu-
ments based on abstention and comity: "While principles of federalism
and comity do suggest that federal courts should generally not interfere
with state criminal prosecutions, and other state law functions, this court
can find no case where those 'principles' were held to be grounds to
declare an act of Congress unconstitutional."'132 Furthermore, because
Mr. Hopper's obligation was "already reduced to judgement .... [t]here
[we]re no issues of Indiana law.., of great importance from a public
policy perspective immediately apparent in th[e] case. Therefore, th[e]
court... need not abstain."'133
The Hopper opinion also responded to the Mussari Court's argu-
ment that the collection of child support payments did not constitute
commerce and was therefore beyond the reach of the commerce
power. 134 The Hopper Court reframed the issue as whether "the act of
collecting an obligation, though dealing with an intangible," amounts to
commerce. 135 Avoiding the definition of commerce used by the Lopez
Court,136 the Hopper Court stated that commerce exists wherever there is
a "continuous and indivisible stream of intercourse among the states in-
volving the transmission of large sums of money and communication by
Id. at 392 (emphasis added).
This statement is incredible given the plain language of the Lopez decision that "the
government concedes that '[n]either the statute nor its legislative history contain[s] express
congressional findings regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a
school zone."' United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995) (quoting Reply Brief for
the United States at 5-6, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (No. 93-1260)).
128 See supra Part LII.A.
129 See supra Part III.B.
130 Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at 391.
131 Id. at 392.
132 Id. at 393.
133 Id. at 394.
134 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
135 Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at 392.
136 "Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It de-
scribes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches,
and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse." United States v. Lopez,
115 S. Ct. 1624, 1627 (1995) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90
(1824)).
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mail, telephone and telegraph."' 137 Using this definition, the court con-
cluded that collecting child support was commerce. 138 The opinion then
proceeded to argue that the CSRA satisfied the "substantial relation to
interstate commerce"'139 prong of Lopez140 by citing Wickard v. Fil-
burn14 1 and arguing that failire to pay support for a child residing in
another state, viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate
commerce.142
After Hopper, the lines were drawn in the debate over the CSRA.
Several other federal courts responding to challenges to the CSRA have
weighed in on the issues raised in these first five cases. 143 To date, only
four of the fifteen cases entertaining such challenges to the CSRA have
resulted in a ruling that the CSRA is unconstitutional.144 Two of these
four decisions were reversed on appeal. 145
C. THE CSRA IN THE APPELLATE COURTS
So far, four United States Circuit Courts have reviewed cases deal-
ing with challenges to the constitutionality of the CSRA. 146 Each one of
these courts has upheld the CSRA. Each appellate court decision has had
to resolve the same issues raised in the first five challenges to the CSRA
discussed above. The Third and Fifth Circuits have yet to hear appeals
137 Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at 392 (quoting United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 226
(1955)).
138 Id. at 392-93 ("[The collection of child support orders across state lines does involve
a continuous and indivisible stream of intercourse among the states involving the transmission
of large sums of money and communication by mail, telephone and telegraph.").
139 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30.
140 Id. at 1630-31.
141 317 U.S. 111 (1942). This famous (or to many, infamous) decision upheld a challenge
to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which allowed the Secretary of Agriculture to set
quotas for the raising of wheat on each farm in the country. A small farmer in Ohio chal-
lenged the Act, claiming that his growing and consuming wheat was a purely local activity and
thus beyond Congress's authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause. The Court rea-
soned that while farmer Filburn's actions in isolation may be trivial, the cumulative effect of
several individuals following his example would undercut Congress's nationwide regulatory
scheme for agricultural products. Therefore, Congress could regulate Filbum's production of
wheat for home consumption.
142 Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at 393.
143 See supra note 66 (listing cases).
144 See supra note 66.
145 United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787
(1996); United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787
(1996).
146 United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027 (1st Cir. 1997) (affirming district court
decision upholding the CSRA); United States v. Sage. 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming
district court decision upholding the CSRA); United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir.
1996) (reversing two district court decisions declaring the CSRA unconstitutional); United
States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996) (affirming district court decision declaring
the CSRA unconstitutional).
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on the two remaining decisions holding the CSRA unconstitutional.
Should these circuits follow their sister circuits and reverse judgments
declaring the CSRA invalid? Or is there some infirmity in the reasoning
of the appellate and district courts that have upheld the CSRA that would
justify the Third and Fifth Circuits parting company with their sister cir-
cuits? The following analysis reveals there is such an infirmity in the
reasoning of opinions upholding the CSRA.
IV. ANALYSIS
The first five cases to consider general constitutional objections1 47
to the CSRA addressed four distinct arguments that have surfaced in all
subsequent challenges to the Act: (1) the CSRA violates the domestic
relations exception to federal court jurisdiction; (2) the CSRA violates
the federalism-based principle of federal-state comity; (3) the CSRA vio-
lates the Tenth Amendment; and (4) the CSRA is invalid because, after
Lopez, it is "beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause." 148 This Part of the Note analyzes these arguments in turn in an
effort to determine the proper resolution of the issues they raise and
which ones, if any, may justify invalidating the CSRA.
A. THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION TO FEDERAL
JURISDIcnON ARGUMENT
Arguments that the CSRA violates the domestic relations exception
to the jurisdiction of federal courts cannot withstand substantive analysis.
Given the lack of merit this argument possesses, it is surprising to see the
amount of ink federal courts have wasted discussing it.149 The domestic
147 Case specific objections to the CSRA have also been made, but most are beyond the
scope of this Note.
Some defendants have attempted to avoid prosecution under the CSRA by arguing that
federal courts should invoke the doctrine of abstention. See supra Part lIl.A and infra Part
IV.B. (discussing United States v. Hampshire and finding the abstention doctrine "inapplicable
because there [were] no pending state proceedings"). It is unlikely that abstention claims
against CSRA prosecutions will succeed because the statute itself does not allow a party to be
prosecuted until there is "a court order or an order of an administrative process pursuant to the
law of a State" which holds that the defendant owes a "past due support obligation" of at least
$5,000. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (d)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
Defendants have also attempted to invoke the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States
Constitution to avoid prosecution under the CSRA. See supra Part III.A (discussing United
States v. Murphy in which an ex post facto defense was found to be without merit).
148 United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993).
149 For discussion of this issue in CSRA cases see, e.g., United States v. Reyes, No. 96-
235, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20241 (D.P.R. Dec. 2, 1996) (rejecting the argument); United
States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1093, 1106-07 (D.R.I. 1996) (rejecting the argument); United
States v. Collins, 921 F. Supp. 1028, 1033 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (rejecting the argument); United
States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (rejecting the argument); United
States v. Kegel, 916 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (rejecting the argument).
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relations exception does not "exist by any constitutional requirement;
rather, it is a rule of statutory construction, in which the [Supreme] Court
has adopted a narrow interpretation of the federal courts' civil diversity
jurisdiction to exclude domestic relations cases."'150 As the Hampshire
Court noted,' 5 1 the doctrine is inapplicable in cases involving the CSRA
because the jurisdiction of federal courts in CSRA cases is not premised
upon diversity jurisdiction.' 52 Rather, it is based upon federal question
jurisdiction, 153 which is valid so long as Congress has the power to legis-
late upon the matter over which jurisdiction is conferred. 154
Although courts may wish that they could avoid hearing CSRA
prosecutions' 55 by extending the domestic relations exception to cases
premised upon federal question jurisdiction, courts cannot unilaterally
make such a significant amendment to their federal question jurisdic-
tion. 156 Furthermore, even if the domestic relations exception could dis-
150 United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1995) (citing Ankenbrant v.
Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 699-700 (1992)).
151 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
152 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
153 Id. at § 1331.
154 See generally Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53
CoLuM. L. Rev. 157, 168 (1953) (discussing the development of and limitations on Congress's
ability to confer original jurisdiction over matters to federal courts).
155 As a matter of policy it is easy to understand why federal courts might wish they could
make the CSRA go away along with the "heavy burden that the federalization of interstate
child support obligations may place upon the [federal] courts." United States v. Hampshire,
892 F. Supp. 1327, 1331 (D. Kan. 1995). The existing criminal docket in federal courts is
already overwhelming. See generally Mengler, supra note 27 (arguing that Congress enacted
too many federal criminal statutes, and in doing so placed an overwhelming burden on federal
courts). Over the last two decades the federal criminal docket has expanded from 27,968 cases
in 1980, to 44,919 in 1994. PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, COM-
MrrTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 14 (Mar.
1995). The problem has been aptly summarized as:
A Congress determined to fight the war on crime by enacting reams of criminal
legislation [under the Commerce Clause] that is frequently duplicative of state penal
codes; an Executive Branch too frequently willing to authorize federal
prosecut[ions] ... as well as to take on a more dominant role in criminal prosecution
that previously had resided in the states; and a federal judiciary increasingly incapa-
ble of managing its caseload because of the nature and size of its criminal docket.
Mengler, supra note 27, at 505 (1995). "Indeed in some districts the civil trial is a chimera,"
because the percentage of the docket devoted to criminal trials is so high; S.D. Cal. 86%, S.D.
Fla. 66%, M.D.N.C. 84.8%, W.D. Tenn. 68%, N.D. Iowa 63.5%, D.N.M. 76.4%, D.N.D.
62.3%, D. Idaho 62.3%, D. Oreg. 64.9%, E.D. Wash. 63.5%. Id. at n.23.
Serious enforcement of the CSRA would significantly increase this already overcrowded
criminal docket. Congressional findings report that there are approximately ten million house-
holds in the United States in which fathers are absent and single mothers are trying to raise
children. H.R. REP. No. 102-771, supra note 11, at 4-5. Furthermore, one-third of child sup-
port cases concern children whose fathers reside in different states, and in fifty-seven percent
of these cases the custodial parent "seldom or never" receives support payments. Id. at 5.
Attempts to prosecute even a fraction of these "deadbeat dads" under the CSRA would signifi-
cantly increase the criminal dockets of federal courts.
156 See generally Mishkin, supra note 154.
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place matters Congress designated as federal questions, the CSRA would
not fall within the scope of the exception as articulated by the Supreme
Court in Ankenbrandt v. Richards.157
According to the Court, the exception applies to three types of
cases. First, it applies to actions seeking issuance or alteration of a di-
vorce decree. Second, it applies to cases involving the issuance or altera-
tion of child custody decrees. Third, it applies to actions pertaining to
issuance or alteration of awards for alimony. 158 The CSRA has nothing
to do with divorce or custody decrees. 159 Without disregarding long ac-
cepted legal definitions, it would require more than creativity to equate
child support 160 with alimony. 161 Thus, given the narrow scope of the
domestic relations exception, coupled with the fact that it applies only to
diversity cases, critics of the CSRA cannot rely on the exception to inval-
idate the statute.
B. FEDERAL-STATE JUDICIAL CoMIrY ARGUMENT
Judicial comity is "It]he principle in accordance with which the
courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial
decisions of another, not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference
and respect."'162 There are two types of comity-interstate comity' 63
and federal-state comity. The comity argument made against the CSRA
deals with federal-state comity. The Supreme Court defined this type of
comity as:
[A] proper respect for state functions, a recognition of
the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of
separate state governments, and a continuance of the be-
lief that the National Government will fare best if the
157 504 U.S. 689, 703 n.6, 704 (1992).
158 Id.
159 See supra Part II.A. This is made clear by the plain language of the statute itself and
is explicitly stated in the "Summary and Purpose" Section of the CSRA's legislative history.
H.R. REP. No. 102-771, supra note 11, at 4.
160 Child support is "[the legal obligation of parents to contribute to the economic main-
tenance, including education, of their children; enforceable in both civil and criminal context."
BLAcK's LAw DrcnoNARY 239 (6th ed. 1990).
161 Alimony is" [a]llowances by which husband or wife by court order pays other spouse
for maintenance while they are separated, or after they are divorced, or temporarily, pending a
suit for divorce." Id. at 73.
162 Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
163 The most famous and contentious cases involving comity among states occurred dur-
ing the antebellum period. They centered on whether or not slave states were obligated to
respect the laws of free states which emancipated slaves travelling through or temporarily
residing on free soil. See, e.g., Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. 82 (1851) (holding that slave states
were under no obligation to recognize either the laws or court orders of free states because
comity was voluntary rather than mandatory).
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States and their institutions are left free to perform their
separate functions in their separate ways.' 64
Manifestations of the judicial concern for the principle of federal-
state comity take two forms.' 65 First, federal courts may, under certain
limited circumstances, 166 abstain from deciding a particular case. 167 Sec-
ond, the Supreme Court has adopted a rule of construction for federal
legislation 168 "affecting the sensitive relation between state and federal
criminal jurisdiction" 16 9 which assumes that, "unless Congress convey§
its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed
the federal-state balance." 170
This clear statement rule obliges federal courts to construe a statute
narrowly to minimize the law's impact on the federal-state balance when
the statutory materials relating to the statute are inconclusive 71 as to the
extent to which Congress intended the measure to alter the federal-state
balance. This ensures that "Congress faced the[ ] serious questions [con-
cerning the effect a measure will have on the division of authority be-
tween the federal government and the States], and meant to affect the
federal-state balance in the way.., claimed by the Government at some
later time."'172
In both United States v. Bailey and United States v. Mussari, the
district court asserted that principles of "comity also support... finding
that the CSRA is unconstitutional."' 7 3 The Mussari Court supported this
conclusion with two observations. First, quoting United States v.
Bass,174 the court asserted that "[u]nless Congress conveys its purpose
clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-
state balance. This assertion is particularly relevant here since Congress
164 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (holding that federal courts must refrain
from hearing injunctive proceedings based upon alleged constitutional violations when such
proceedings seek to enjoin an already pending state criminal proceeding).
165 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 CASE W. L. REv. 1 (1984)
(asserting that to protect the role the Constitution and its structure create for states and their
judicial systems, federal courts must imply limitations upon their power).
166 See infra notes 181-88 and accompanying text.
167 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AmcERIAN CoNsTrruTIONAL LAW § 3-28 at 195-208 (2d ed.
1988).
168 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S.
808, 812 (1971); United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 449-50 (1953).
169 Bass, 404 U.S. at 349.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 350.
172 Id.
173 United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360, 1368 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787
(1996). See also United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727, 728-29 (1995) (discussing
comity).
174 Bass, 404 U.S. at 349.
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has traditionally been reluctant to define, as a federal crime, conduct al-
ready denounced as criminal by the states." 175
Second, the Mussari court noted that:
[A] defendant being prosecuted under the CSRA could
arguably defend the action by challenging the validity of
the underlying state court support order. Either the fed-
eral court would be forced to review the support order,
or stay the pending federal criminal case while the sup-
port order is collaterally attacked in state court. Neither
of these scenarios is desirable in light of the principles of
comity and the Speedy Trial provisions federal courts
are bound by in criminal matters. 176
The first observation, concerning the absence of a clear statement of
congressional intent (certainly of questionable accuracy), 177 was an effort
to invoke the comity-based clear statement rule of narrow statutory inter-
pretation. The latter observation, regarding the possibility of CSRA
prosecutions resulting in federal courts second-guessing state court deter-
minations of state law to avoid delays, was an appeal to the comity-based
doctrine of abstention. 178 Neither concept, however, provides a basis for
a court concluding that the CSRA is unconstitutional. As the court in
United States v. Hopper noted, there are "no cases" where the principle
of comity is cited as grounds for declaring "an act of Congress unconsti-
tutional."'179 This is because both the doctrines, federal courts use' 80 to
defend the principles of comity, narrow construction and abstention, ap-
ply only to the specific facts of a particular case.
The comity-based doctrine of abstention is exercised when one of
three situations arise. 181 One situation is when difficult and unsettled
questions of state law must be resolved before a substantial federal ques-
tion can be decided.182 This is done out of respect for the function of
state courts as "the principal expositers of state law."' 83 The second situ-
ation involves cases where federal courts refrain from granting declara-
tory or injunctive relief from a pending state law proceeding on
constitutional grounds when the state action provides an adequate forum
175 Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1367. Wilful failure to pay child support is a crime in at least
42 states. H.R. REP. No. 102-771, supra note 11, at 6.
176 Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1367.
177 See infra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
178 Such concerns are not discussed anywhere in the legislative history of the CSRA.
179 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
180 TRINE, supra note 167, § 3-28, at 196.
181 GERALD GuNTHER, CONSTriTUONAL LAW 1643-51 (12th ed. 1991).
182 Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
183 Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 429 (1979).
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to address the constitutional issues. 184 This facet of abstention is justi-
fied by the importance of maintaining efficient federal and state court
systems by respecting the concurrent jurisdiction state courts possess
over most federal claims.' 8 5 Federal courts will also abstain from decid-
ing cases involving issues of state law that would significantly affect
state "policy problems of'substantial public import whose importance
transcends the result in the case then at bar."' 86  Regardless of the con-
cern actuating a federal court to defend the principle of comity by invok-
ing abstention, abstention simply permits a federal court to "postpone"' 87
hearing a particular case. And, as both the First and Ninth Circuits
noted, abstention has never been used to invalidate the statute creating
the underlying cause of action.' 88
The Mussari Court's hypothetical regarding a federal court having
to delay or stay a pending federal prosecution under the CSRA while a
state court hears challenges to the underlying support decree 189 is a per-
fect example of a situation in which a federal court may abstain from
hearing a case until the questions of state law are resolved. The relevant
issues of state law, however, will normally be decided before a federal
prosecution under the CSRA is commenced. Although it is possible for
the situation envisioned by the Mussari Court to arise, as it did in United
States v. Lewis,190 there is little risk that a federal court will usurp the
function of state courts as "the principle expositers of state [domestic]
law." Admittedly, it may "not be desirable" to have a federal court delay
hearing a claim until the underlying issues of state law are resolved, and
doing so may pose a great inconvenience to federal courts hearing CSRA
prosecutions. 19 1
184 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49-53 (1971). See generally, Michael Wells, The
Role of Comity in the Law of Federal Courts, 60 N.C. L. REv. 59 (1981) (discussing instances
when federal courts do and should act to protect the principle of comity).
185 See TRiBE, supra note 167, §3-28 at 201-208.
186 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976).
187 Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176 (1959). Courts hearing CSRA claims may
wish to consider whether it is necessary to delay hearing a specific CSRA prosecution. For an
excellent example of such an analysis see United States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1093, 1106-08
(D.R.I. 1996) (rejecting request that court abstain from hearing a CSRA prosecution until a
state court decided pending motion to vacate the judgment attributing to the defendant pater-
nity of the child benefitting from the support order).
188 See United States v. Bongiomo, 106 F.3d 1027, 1034 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v.
Mussari, 95 F.3d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 1996). See generally, Martin Redish, Abstention, Separa-
tion of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984) (discussing the
abstention doctrine). But see Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish is Wrong About Absten-
tion, 19 GA. L. REv. 1097 (1985).
189 See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
190 936 F. Supp. 1093, 1095-96, 1106-08 (D.R.I. 1996).
191 United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360, 1366 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787
(1996).
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But the relevant question when assessing the constitutional validity
of the CSRA is not whether it is convenient for federal courts to adjudi-
cate the matter. Given "the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal
courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them," 192 the relevant question is
whether the federal courts have jurisdiction over CSRA cases. Article III
of the Constitution leaves this issue, and the policy questions surround-
ing it, for Congress, rather than the Judiciary, to resolve. Congress has
granted the courts of the United States federal question jurisdiction to
hear CSRA prosecutions. 193 This grant of jurisdiction can only be invali-
dated if it was beyond Congress's inherent authority to legislate upon the
matter over which jurisdiction was conferred. Accordingly, federal
courts cannot in the name of federalism use the comity-based doctrine of
abstention as an alternative route to the conclusion that the CSRA is
unconstitutional.' 9 4
The Mussari Court also asserted that the statutory materials sur-
rounding the CSRA did not provide a clear statement of congressional
intent to affect a change in federal-state criminal jurisdiction over failure
to pay interstate child support.' 95 Assuming, arguendo, that no such
statement appeared in the CSRA or its legislative history, this would not
justify holding the entire statute unconstitutional. It would simply per-
mit the court to construe the scope of the statute narrowly so that it could
hold particular prosecutions beyond the scope of the law.' 96 Further-
more, it is difficult to understand how a judge reading the statutory
materials accompanying the CSRA could not find a clear statement of
Congress's intent to criminalize failure to pay child support for a child
residing in another state although such failure is "already denounced as
criminal by the states."' 97 In the legislative history of the CSRA, Con-
gress specifically noted that:
[A]t least 42 states have made willfull [sic] failure to pay
child support a crime, punishable in some states by im-
prisonment for up to ten years. Unfortunately, the abil-
ity of those states to enforce such laws outside their own
boundaries is severely limited. Although most states
have adopted the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act, which includes provisions designed to deal
with the extradition of interstate child support defend-
192 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976).
193 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994).
194 TRIBE, supra note 167, § 3-28, at 206.
195 Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1366-67.
196 Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S.
336, 349 (1971); Justice Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
CoLuM. L. Rv. 527, 540-44 (1947).
197 Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1363.
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ants and the processing of requests for enforcement of
support orders, interstate extradition and enforcement in
fact remains a tedious, cumbersome and slow method of
collection. [The CSRA] addresses the problem of inter-
state enforcement of child support by taking the incen-
tive out of moving interstate to avoid payment. The
[law] is designed to target interstate cases only. These
are the cases which state officials report to be clearly the
most difficult to enforce, especially the "hard core"
group of parents who flagrantly refuse to pay and whom
traditional [interstate] extradition procedures have ut-
terly failed to bring to justice.198
Clearly, neither of the doctrines used to enforce the federalism-
based principle of federal-state comity-abstention and the clear-state-
ment rule-provide even a colorable basis for declaring the CSRA un-
constitutional. Efforts to invoke comity as a grounds to invalidate the
CSRA, or any statute for that matter, constitute wishful thinking. 199 The
portions of the First and Ninth Circuit opinions recognizing this fact
should be followed by other circuits.
C. THE TENTH AMENDMENT/COMMERCE CLAUSE ARGUMENT:
ACTUALLY THE SAME QUESTION
Opponents of the CSRA have made an attack on the Statute that
cannot be dismissed as easily as those based on the domestic relations
exception and federal-state comity. This attack focuses on the scope of
Congress's power to legislate under the Commerce Clause and whether
or not the CSRA infringes upon the powers the Tenth Amendment
reserves to the states. The key to determining the merits of these argu-
ments is understanding the impact Lopez will have on Congress's ability
to legislate under the Commerce Clause. Lopez requires federal courts to
decide whether Congress exceeded its commerce power by enacting a
measure in the first instance. 200 However, before discussing whether or
not the CSRA is likely to be upheld as a constitutional exercise of Con-
gress's commerce power in the post-Lopez era, it is necessary to explain
why it is impossible to analyze the merits of Tenth Amendment argu-
198 H.R. REP. No. 102-771, supra note 11, at 6. Many commentators concur in Con-
gress's conclusion that the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act and other efforts
to enforce support decrees across state lines are grossly inadequate. See, e.g., Calhoun, supra
note 21.
199 "If wishes were horses then beggars would ride." KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAM-
BLE BUSH 18 (9th ed. 1991).
200 The ramifications of Lopez have been considered in every challenge to the CSRA. See
supra Part III.
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ment20 against the CSRA without first determining the scope of the
commerce power.
1. Why the Tenth Amendment Argument Cannot Be Resolved
in Isolation
The Tenth Amendment has not been an independent limitation upon
congressional power to regulate private actors20 2 since the Supreme
Court decided United States v. Darby in 1941.203 In Darby, the Court
decided that the auxiliary precautions the Framers placed in the Constitu-
tion to limit the scope of the national government's power posed an in-
convenient obstacle to New Deal legislation. 20 4 The Supreme Court
accommodated "the era's perceived necessity" by declaring the Tenth
Amendment "but a truism [stating] that all is retained which has not been
surrendered. 20 5 Under this novel interpretation, the Tenth Amendment
was no longer an independent, substantive limitation protecting and
maintaining the federal system the Framers had created.20 6 It became
just an aside, a superfluous reminder of what was evident throughout the
201 See supra Part IlI.B.
202 In 1941, the Court re-interpreted the Tenth Amendment as posing no independent
barrier to Congress's ability to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause. United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
203 The Court continues to hold that regulation of states as entities, rather than of private
actors, may in certain instances cause congressional action to be an unconstitutional violation
of the state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment. New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 161 (1992) ("Congress may not simply commandeer the legislative process of the
States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory scheme.").
204 See generally Harry N. Scheiber, State Law and "Industrial Policy" in American De-
velopment 1789-1987,75 CAL. L. Rv. 415 (1987) (discussing how the concept of dual sover-
eiguty reinforced by the Tenth Amendment affected American industrial policy and was
eventually abandoned during the New Deal to permit Congress to pass legislation, which was
of questionable value in relieving the economic dislocation of the Great Depression); William
W. Van Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, the States and the Tenth Amendment: Adrift in the
Cellophane Sea, 1987 DuKE L.J. 769, 773 n.3 (stating that Justice Stone's view that the Tenth
amendment stated a mere truism "was more hubris than insight, a reflection of judicial values
in the age of the national state").
Prior to the New Deal the Court often invoked the Tenth Amendment as an independent,
substantive limit upon the power of the federal government. See, e.g., United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11 (1895):
It cannot be denied that the power of a state to protect the lives, health, and property of its
citizens, and to preserve good order and the public morals, the power to govern men and things
within the limits of its dominion is a power originally and always belonging to the States, not
surrendered by them to the general government, nor directly constrained by the Constitution of
the United States, and essentially exclusive.
Id.
205 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards
Act).
206 For cases in which the Court had interpreted the Tenth Amendment as such a limita-
tion see, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11 (1895); Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. 113, 124-25 (1876); United States v. DeWitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41, 45 (1869); New
Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. 662, 736 (1836).
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Constitution-that the Framers established a federal system of dual
sovereignty.207
When coupled with the Commerce Clause jurisprudence that the
Court developed during the New Deal era,208 this view of the Tenth
Amendment left the states with residual authority to regulate only those
private activities that Congress did not presently feel like regulating. 20 9
As a result, courts are correct in stating that modem Tenth Amendment
inquiries into legislation affecting private parties consist of simply asking
whether or not Congress possesses authority under the Commerce
Clause, or one of the other enumerated powers, to enact the law in ques-
tion.2 10 Although the New Deal interpretation of the Tenth Amendment
is currently being subjected to an increasing tide of criticism from schol-
ars2 11 and judges212 and may in fact be eroding,2 13 the Supreme Court
has yet to clearly indicate that it has abandoned Justice Stone's
brainchild. Even Justices considered the most ardent defenders of the
207 Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
208 For a detailed description of the Commerce Clause jurisprudence developed during the
New Deal, see infra, Part IV.C.2.b.
209 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 289
(1981):
To object to [the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977] appellees
must assume that the Tenth Amendment limits Congressional power to pre-empt or
displace state regulations of private activities. . . .This assumption is incorrect
... the Court long ago rejected the suggestion that Congress invades areas reserved
to the States by the Tenth Amendment simply because it exercises its authority under
the Commerce Clause in a manner that displaces the States' exercise of their police
powers.
Id.
210 For CSRA cases properly construing and clearly articulating the current framework for
Tenth Amendment challenges to regulation that does not regulate "States as States" see, e.g.,
United States v. Bongiomo, 106 F.3d 1027, 1033-34 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Mussari,
95 F.3d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1004 (10th Cir.
1996); United States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v.
Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389, 393 (S.D. Ind. 1996). See also D. Bruce LaPierre, Political Ac-
countability in the National Political Process-the Alternative to Judicial Review of Federal-
ism, 80 NW. U. L. Rev. 577, 618-24 (1985).
211 See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958); Martin H. Redish & Karin L
Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial Review: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 8-14 & nn. 33-56 (1987).
212 Recently, one member of the Supreme Court reminded his compeers that the Court has
"turn[ed] the Tenth Amendment on its head." United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1645
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
213 For the clearest and most comprehensive catalogue of evidence that "the times they
are-a-changin" in Tenth Amendment analysis of regulation of private actors, see the powerful
argument of Judge Danny J. Boggs of the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Unites States
v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1479-81 (6th Cir. 1996) (Boggs, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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federal system continue to pay lipservice to214 the New Deal version of
the Tenth Amendment.215
The Supreme Court's schizophrenia regarding whether or not the
Tenth Amendment serves as a substantive barrier to federal regulation
affecting the states as states216 will not affect the fate of the CSRA be-
cause it is a criminal sanction that regulates only private actors. There-
fore, courts are supported by sound precedent if they collapse the
question of whether the CSRA violates the Tenth Amendment into the
question of whether Congress exceeded the scope of its commerce power
when it enacted the CSRA.
2. The Commerce Clause
Prior to the Supreme Court's landmark decision in United States v.
Lopez, it would not have been possible to convince a federal court that
Congress exceeded the limits of its commerce power by enacting the
CSRA.217 In the aftermath of Lopez, however, courts must take such
arguments seriously because the Supreme Court made clear that there is
a boundary that Congress cannot transgress with its commerce power.
The analysis federal courts have used in the CSRA cases, which will be
discussed later, indicates that the lower courts are, either through wilful
blindness or honest misinterpretation, failing to recognize the markers
left by the Lopez majority delineating the boundary of the commerce
power.
The remainder of this Note will focus on deciphering the message
of Lopez and its implications for the CSRA. The process of discerning
where the limits of the Commerce Clause lie after Lopez can be facili-
214 Justice O'Connor accepted Justice Stone's linguistic nihilism in New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992).
215 Professor Epstein has ably illustrated that, contrary to the arguments of proponents of
the New Deal expansion of federal power, Justice Stone's interpretation of the Tenth Amend-
ment was a sharp break from any previous interpretation of the Constitution. Richard A. Ep-
stein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REv. 1387, 1400-54 (1987).
Professor Epstein also shows that rather than being the result of any principled textual
interpretation of the Constitution, the New Deal expansion of federal power resulted from the
fact that "a narrow majority of the Court was in sympathy with the dominant intellectual belief
of the time" which rejected the Founders' "belief that government was not an unrequited good
but, was at best a necessary evil." IL at 1443.
216 See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (relying on the Tenth
Amendment to invalidate application of federal wage and hour regulations as to State govern-
ments), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding
that the Tenth Amendment provides no substantive barrier to applying congressional wage and
hour regulations to state governments). But see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992) (holding that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from commandeering the state
legislative process).
217 See TRimE, supra note 167, § 5-8 at 316 (discussing judicial review of congressional
acts under the Commerce Clause and concluding Court review amounted to a mere
"formality").
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tated by briefly reviewing where the boundary has been and where it was
prior to Lopez. The history of the Commerce Clause can be divided into
three general periods. The first period consists of the Commerce Clause
jurisprudence prior to the New Deal. The second period begins with the
New Deal and ends with Lopez. The third period consists of the post-
Lopez era.
a. Before the New Deal: Meaningful Review of the
Commerce Power
When the founding fathers convened in Philadelphia to design "a
more perfect Union, '218 they were determined to design a government
free "from the defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the
commerce between its several members. ' 219 This determination resulted
in Article I , Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution, which empowers
Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with Indian Tribes."
The first meaningful judicial interpretation of the Commerce Clause
came in the 1824 case of Gibbons v. Ogden.220 The case involved ex-
actly the kind of "interfering and unneighbourly [commercial] regula-
tions of ... States" which the Founders intended to prevent by placing
the Commerce Clause in the Constitution.221 Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Marshall rejected Mr. Ogden's narrow definition of com-
merce, which excluded navigation, and explained that:
Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something
more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial in-
tercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its
branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carry-
ing on that intercourse. The mind can scarcely conceive
a system for regulating commerce between nations,
218 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
219 See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(discussing the impetus for and scope of the Commerce Clause).
220 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). In this case, the state of New York had granted Robert
Fulton and Robert Livingston an exclusive franchise to operate steamships in New York wa-
ters. Fulton and Livingston subsequently sold an interest in the franchise to Mr. Ogden. Ves-
sels using steam power in New York water without the permission of the franchisees were
sued for damages in New York courts. New Jersey retaliated by enacting a law allowing New
Jersey residents fined in New York courts for operating steam vessels without permission to
recover treble damages in New Jersey courts against the parties for whom New York courts
entered judgment. Mr. Gibbons of New Jersey claimed the right to operate a steam vessel
between New York and New Jersey under his federal coasting license, which he claimed ex-
empted him from having to get permission from the New York franchisees. The New York
Supreme Court granted Ogden an injunction against Gibbons. Gibbons appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court. Id. at 3-5, 194-95.
221 THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 144 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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which shall exclude all laws concerning navigation,
which shall be silent on the admission of the vessels of
the one nation into the ports of the other, and be con-
fined to prescribing rules for the conduct of individuals,
in the actual employment of buying or selling, or of
barter.222
After defining "commerce" for purposes of the Commerce Clause,
Marshall explained that the commerce power "is the power to regulate;
that is to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed" and
that "like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other
than are prescribed in the Constitution. ' '223 The Gibbons Court, how-
ever, emphatically stated that limitations on the commerce power ex-
isted22 4 and used commercial transactions occurring within the borders of
a single state as an example of the type of commerce Congress could not
reach under the Commerce Clause.225
For quite some time after Gibbons v. Ogden, Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence developed almost exclusively through "cases dealing with
limits on state action affecting interstate commerce. ' 226 In these cases,
the Court was not scrutinizing congressional regulations enacted under
the commerce power. The Court was instead scrutinizing commercial
regulations passed by states to determine whether they interfered with the
"freedom of interstate commerce allegedly guaranteed by Art. I, § 8, cl.
3."227 From these cases, the Court developed its "dormant" Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.
The Court had few occasions22 8 to pass judgment upon congres-
sional action pursuant to the Commerce Clause until Congress made sig-
222 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824).
223 Id. at 196.
224 Id.
225 It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce, which is
completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between
different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States.
Such a power would be inconvenient and is certainly unnecessary.
Comprehensive as the word "among" is, it may very properly be restricted to
that commerce which concerns more States than one. The phrase is not one which
would probably have been selected to indicate the completely interior traffic of a
State, because it is not an apt phrase for that purpose... The enumeration presup-
poses something not enumerated, and that something, if we regard the language of
the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State.
Id. at 194-95.
226 GuNTHER, supra note 181, at 97.
227 Id.
228 Among the few instances the Supreme Court had to determine the limits of Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause during the nineteenth century were: The Trade Mark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (holding Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause powers by estab-
lishing a trademark registration system because the statute was "designed to govern commerce
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nificant use of its commerce power during the latter part of the
nineteenth century.2 2 9 Judicial interpretation of Congress's commerce
power eventually progressed along three lines. The first line was the
progeny of Gibbons v. Ogden and dealt with regulating the "instrumen-
talities of interstate commerce. '2 30 The second line of interpretation in-
volved use of the commerce power to keep the channels of interstate
commerce free from "immoral and injurious uses;"'2 3 1 this allowed Con-
gress to regulate the private conduct of citizens on either the sending or
receiving end of interstate transactions.23 2 The third line of cases in-
volved Congress's ability to reach wholly intrastate commercial activities
as a means of implementing broader regulation of interstate commercial
activities.
i. Instrumentalities of Commerce
The facet of the commerce power allowing Congress to regulate the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, such as ships, evolved from the
reasoning of Gibbons v. Ogden. This branch of the commerce power
developed into a mature form when the Supreme Court decided the case
of The Daniel Ball in 1870.233 In The Daniel Ball, the Court upheld the
1852 Inspection Act as applied to ships that operated solely within the
waters of one state, so long as the ship transported cargo as part of a plan
to place commodities in interstate commerce.2 34 Speaking for the Court,
Justice Field explained that Congress's authority to regulate the instru-
ments of interstate commerce must be considered from a broad and prac-
tical viewpoint because a narrow conception prevented Congress from
using the Commerce Clause to solve the type of problems it was intended
to ameliorate.2 35
Justice Field's "instrumentalities of commerce" rationale was subse-
quently used to uphold federal railway regulation. In 1886, the Supreme
wholly between citizens of the same state"); United States v. DeWitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41
(1870) (holding that Congress could not prohibit all sales of illuminating oil which required
heat in excess of 110 degrees fahrenheit to ignite because it was a "police regulation, relating
exclusively to the internal trade of states.").
229 Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 and the Sherman Antitrust Act
in 1890.
230 Epstein, supra note 215, at 1409.
231 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917).
232 See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 374 (1903) ( Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
233 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
234 Id. at 565.
235 Justice Field stated that Congress must be able to regulate instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce, i.e., ships, within the boundaries of a single state because if "[s]everal agen-
cies combining, each taking up the commodity transported at the boundary line at one end of a
State, and leaving it at the boundary line of the other end, [can avoid federal regula-
tion] ... Federal jurisdiction would be entirely ousted and [the commerce power ] would be a
dead letter." Id.
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Court held that states could not regulate fares on railway runs that began
in one state and terminated in another state.236 Later, in Houston, East &
West Texas Railway v. United States (The Shreveport Rate Case),237
Congress's power to regulate the instrumentalities of commerce was in-
terpreted to include "control over... interstate carrier[s] in all matters
having a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce. '2 38 The
pragmatism urged by Justice Field in The Daniel Ball won the day in the
Shreveport Rate Case and its progeny.239 These cases showed that rather
than requiring a narrow, abstractly logical nexus between the local activ-
ity Congress wished to regulate and instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce, a practical, realistic relationship would suffice.240 Under this
facet of the commerce power, Congress had significant and undisputed
power to regulate the "instrumentalities of commerce" by the early twen-
tieth century. This power was, however, limited to regulations concern-
ing "transportation by rail, river [and] road."'241
ii. Immoral and Injurious Uses of Interstate Commerce
It was not until the mid-twentieth century that the Court read a
quasi-"police power" into the Commerce Clause.242 In the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, however, the idea of national reform
measures to cure evils ranging from impure foods, gambling, drinking,
prostitution, and white slavery gained widespread popular support.243
Proponents of national legislation to cure the perceived evils of the day,
such as Albert Beveridge and Theodore Roosevelt, were elected to na-
tional officeY24 Justices with similar views were subsequently appointed
to the Supreme Court.245 During this era, Congress was permitted to
enact legislation "far removed from the economic concerns that'. . . had
prompted the Commerce Clause" and which "seemed to be primarily
moral [legislation] . 246
236 Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
237 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
238 Id. at 355.
239 The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
557 (1870).
240 See GUNTHER, supra note 181, at 99.
241 Epstein, supra note 215, at 1421.
242 In United States v. DeWitt, the Court explicitly rejected the idea that the Commerce
Clause imparted a "police power" to Congress. 76 U.S. ( 9 Wall.) 4, 45 (1870).
243 See, e.g., GUNTHER, supra note 181, at 109.
244 Id.
245 See generally KATHERiNE DRINKER BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPus (2d ed., 1961)
(biography of Justice Holmes, who was appointed to the Court by Theodore Roosevelt and
accepted, for pragmatic reasons, that the Constitution permitted Congress to pass national
measures to respond to the "felt necessities of the times").
246 GUNTHER, supra note 181, at 106.
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Congress's power to pass measures under the Commerce Clause
aimed at keeping the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral
and injurious uses was recognized by the Court in Champion v. Ames
(The Lottery Case).247 Ames involved the constitutionality of the Federal
Lottery Act of 1895. The Act prohibited the movement of lottery tickets
across state lines.248 Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan concluded
that:
[A]s a State may, for the purpose of guarding the morals
of its own people, forbid all sales of lottery tickets
within its limits, so Congress, for the purpose of guard-
ing the people of the United States against the "wide-
spread pestilence of lotteries" . . . may prohibit the
carrying of lottery tickets from one State to another.249
This vague standard was more clearly defined in later cases which picked
up on a statement by the dissent in Ames. 2 50 The later opinions limited
this facet of commerce power regulation to "things in themselves
injurious." 251
In Hammer v. Dagenhart,252 the Court showed that a "things harm-
ful in themselves" standard could serve as an enforceable limit on this
second branch of the commerce power. Dagenhart held that the 1916
Child Labor Act, which prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce
of any goods manufactured at any plant employing child laborers under
the age of fourteen,253 was unconstitutional because the regulated goods
were "themselves harmless." 254  Therefore, the law infringed upon the
police power reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment and was
beyond Congress's reach under the Commerce Clause. 255
247 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
248 Id. at 321-25.
249 Id. at 359.
250 See id. at 374 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that lottery tickets should not be sub-
ject to congressional regulation because he did not find lottery tickets to be "in themselves
injurious").
251 See, e.g., Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding the Mann Act, which
prohibited the transportation of women and girls in interstate commerce for immoral pur-
poses); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (upholding the Pure Food and
Drug Act of 1906, which prohibited transporting adulterated foods in interstate commerce).
252 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
253 The act also prohibited employing laborers between the ages of fourteen and sixteen
for more than eight hours a day, six days a week. The Child Labor Act was not an effort to
solve a problem states were neglecting to address, but rather an effort to establish a uniform
rule for child labor that would override the laws each state had already enacted on the subject.
Id. at 268-69 n.l.
254 Id. at 272.
255 Id. at 273-74.
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The Dagenhart majority sympathized with the substance and pur-
pose of the Child Labor Act,25 6 but it refused to bend the limit on this
facet of the commerce power. Justice Holmes, in a dissent in which
three other Justices joined, asserted that the "things dangerous in them-
selves" test was simply a way for the court to "intrude its judgment upon
questions of policy or morals. ' 257 Despite the uneasiness many Justices
felt about displacing congressional enactments under a standard as vague
and subjective as "things harmful in themselves," this test remained a
meaningful limit on Congress's commerce power until the New Deal.
iii. Congressional Regulation of Local Activities-The Direct!
Indirect Distinction
The third branch of the early commerce power allowed Congress to
regulate wholly intrastate activities in order to facilitate broader regula-
tion of interstate commerce. This branch of the commerce power grew
out of cases which challenged Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause to prohibit various activities under the Sherman Antitrust Act of
1890. To delimit the scope of Congress's authority to regulate local ac-
tivities that affected interstate commerce but were unrelated to the instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce, the Court adopted a formalistic2 58
analysis.259 This approach seemed the antithesis of the broad, pragmatic
approach used to assess regulation of local activities which did affect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. 260
The first important case in the development of this facet of the com-
merce power was United States v. E.C. Knight Co.261 Knight involved
the government's effort to use the Sherman Act to prevent the American
Sugar Refining Company from gaining almost absolute control of Amer-
ican domestic sugar refining capacity by purchasing four large sugar re-
fineries in Pennsylvania. 262 The case centered around two issues: first,
"whether a preliminary step (be it merger or cartel) toward a proposed
sale of goods in interstate commerce was itself part of interstate com-
256 Id. at 275 ('That there should be limitations upon the right to employ children in
mines and factories in the interest of their own and the public welfare, all will admit").
257 Id. at 280 (Holmes, J., dissenting, joined by McKenna, Brandeis, and Clarke, J.J.).
258 Unlike many in the legal community, I use the word "formalistic" to connote only
those legal constructs that are inappropriately formal. By no means do I intend to condemn all
manifestations of formality. Form and the values it serves are essential to our legal system,
even if they are often overlooked by many American academics. For more on this, see, e.g.,
Robert S. Summers, Theory Formality and Practical Legal Criticism, 1990 L. Q. REv. 407
(explaining the deficiencies in modes of criticism condemning legal doctrine for being overly
formal).
259 GutirmR, supra note 181, at 99.
260 See supra Part IV.C.2.a.i.
261 156 U.S. 1 (1894).
262 See id. at 9.
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merce; and second, even if a preliminary step were part of interstate
commerce, could Congress reach it by regulating manufacture?"2 63
The American Sugar Refining Company argued that the Govern-
ment did not have the power under the Sherman Act to obstruct local
activities, such as manufacturing, unrelated to the instrumentalities of in-
terstate commerce when such activities affected interstate commerce
"only incidentally and indirectly. ' '264 The Knight Court agreed. The
Court held that even if the merger of Pennsylvania and New Jersey sugar
refineries at issue was itself part of interstate commerce, Congress could
not prevent it by regulating manufacturing at sugar refineries. 265 The
majority explained:
Doubtless the power to control the manufacture of a
given thing involves in a certain sense the control of its
disposition, but this is a secondary and not the primary
sense; and although the exercise of that power may re-
sult in bringing the operation of commerce into play, it
does not control it, and affects it only incidentally and
indirectly. Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is
not a part of it.2 66
The indirect/direct distinction the Court applied to regulation of lo-
cal affairs premised upon the commerce power but not involving instru-
mentalities of commerce was clarified four years after Knight in
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States.267 In this case, a unanimous
Supreme Court upheld a Sherman Act challenge to a contract between
several large midwest cast iron pipe manufacturers. 268 The contract seg-
mented the Midwestern market for their product in a manner that gave
each company a local monopoly.269 Addyston Pipe was similar to E.C.
Knight in that both involved preliminary consolidation arrangements; but
the cases differed in that the preliminary agreement at issue in Addyston,
263 Epstein, supra note 215, at 1437. This description of the issues in Knight is consistent
with the Court's characterization of the issues, but it is much more clearly articulated than any
of the Justices' explanations. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 9-46 (1895).
264 Knight involved the government's challenge to efforts by the American Sugar Refin-
ing Company (a New Jersey corporation) to acquire four Pennsylvania sugar refineries. The
government claimed authority under the Sherman Antitrust Act to prevent the merger because
it was "a combination or contract in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states."
E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 9. The government contended that permitting the merger would
make American Sugar the refiner of 98% of the nation's sugar, thus allowing them a virtual
monopoly and the ability to set prices without having to consider competitive influences. Id.
at 18.
265 Id. at 16-18.
266 Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
267 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
268 Id. at 226-48.
269 Id. at 213-25.
[Vol. 6:753
19971
unlike the one in Knight, did not involve manufacturing and explicitly
addressed plans for interstate sales of a product.270
It was upon this distinction that the Court based its holding in the
1905 Swift case involving an agreement among meat dealers to contrac-
tually fix bidding in livestock markets across the nation.271 Writing for
the Court, Justice Holmes explained:
[I]t is a direct object [of the agreement], it is that for the
sake of which the several specifid acts and courses of
conduct are done and adopted. Therefore the case is not
like U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co., where the subject matter of
the combination was manufacture [of sugar] and the di-
rect object monopoly of manufacture within a State.
H6wever likely monopoly of commerce among the
States in the article manufactured was to follow from the
agreement it was not a necessary consequence nor a pri-
mary end. Here the subject matter is sales and the very
point of the combination is to restrain and monopolize
commerce among the States in respect of such sales.27 2
Thus, by the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court developed
a jurisprudence that allowed it to review congressional enactments pre-
mised upon the Commerce Clause by classifying acts into one of three
categories: (1) regulation of matters having a close and substantial rela-
tion to the instrumentalities of interstate commerce; (2) regulations
aimed at preventing immoral and injurious uses of the channels of inter-
state commerce; and (3) regulation of wholly intrastate activities unre-
lated to the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Once the Court
classified an act, it proceeded to decide whether or not Congress had
exceeded the distinct limitation established for the facet of the commerce
power under which the act fe. 273 This analytic framework did not al-
ways function as a precise formula.274 In addition, the vague and subjec-
tive nature of standards such as direct versus indirect and "things harmful
270 Ia at 240-41.
271 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 394 (1905).
272 d at 397 (citation omitted).
273 See Epstein, supra note 215, at 1441-43.
274 Sometimes the Court was unable to convince itself which category a measure fell into.
Such confusion resulted in difficulty determining which limitation was applicable. See, e.g.,
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923) (The Grain Futures Act of 1922 was upheld.
The Court first gave a long explanation of how the facts related to "instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce" and then shifted to reliance on Swift.); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 517
(1922) (The Court upheld the Packers and Stockyard Act of 1921 regulating middlemen who
arranged for the purchase and transportation of cattle from the Western States to slaughter-
houses and processors in the Midwest. The opinion displays the Court's uncertainty as to
whether the act fell under the "instrumentalities of commerce" line of analysis or the direct/
indirect line of cases. The opinion first analogized the facts of the case to the pattern in its
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in themselves" left the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence open to
Justice Holmes's criticism that it was merely a way for the Court to "in-
trude its judgment upon questions of policy and morals. '2 75 Neverthe-
less, in an era when a majority of the Court viewed the evils incumbent
with judicial enforcement of the constitutional principles of federlism
and limited and enumerated powers as a lesser evil than granting Con-
gress boundless authority to regulate every facet of human life under the
pretext of regulating commerce, this jurisprudence provided a means of
ensuring that there were limits to the commerce power.
b. The New Deal and Judicial Abdication: Le Diluge2 76
The unparalleled economic and social upheaval of the Great De-
pression and the expedients intended to alleviate it277 provided the back-
drop for the greatest test of the Court's ability to uphold the counter-
majoritarian structural mechanisms 278 in the Constitution that limit the
power of the federal government.2 79 The Court failed this test. Despite
"instrumentalities of commerce" cases and then shifted to asserting that Swift (a direct/indirect
precedent) justified upholding the law).
275 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 280 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
276 From the statement attributed to Jeanne, Marquis De Pompadour in reply to Louis XV
after the defeat of the French and Austrian armies by Frederick the Great in the battle of
Rossbach on November 5, 1757. "Apr~s nous le diluge" (After us the Deluge). JOHN
BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 324 (16th ed., 1992).
277 For summaries of the unparalleled distress that ensued in the wake of the Great De-
pression, which began in 1929 and continued until 1941, and the efforts made to remedy the
situation see, e.g., THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERIcAN HISTORY 279-82 (Eric Foner &
John A. Garraty eds., 1991); WILLIAM J. KIEFE ET AL., AMERIcAN DEMocRAcY: INsTrru-
TIONS, POLrrIcs AND POLICY 456-59 (1986); GUNTHER, supra note 181, at 115.
278 Professor Redish explains that the Founders' decision to expressly enumerate in the
Constitution those powers the federal government was to have along with the Tenth Amend-
ment clearly demonstrates that they intended to have a non-majoritarian branch pass upon the
constitutionality of enactments by the majoritarian branches regardless of the adequacy of the
political process from which such measures derived. Redish & Drizin, supra note 211, at 12-
16 (1987). See also, THE FEDERALIST No. 78 at 466-67 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961).
By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified excep-
tions to the legislative authority .... Limitations of this kind can only be preserved
in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it
must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.
Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to
nothing.
Id.
279 See Redish & Drizin, supra note 211, at 10-13; Justice William Rehnquist, The Notion
of A Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REv. 693, 699 (1976). But see William Cohen, Speech to
the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Constitutional Law Meeting, Washington,
D.C. (Oct. 8, 1987) (arguing that the Court's departure from its traditional Commerce Clause
jurisprudence was an inevitable and proper response to the historical forces of the time and
legitimated by the landslide re-election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1936).
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"doubts as to Constitutionality, however reasonable," 280 the Court
proved unable to endure the majoritarian pressures urging it to uphold
New Deal legislation and eventually "acceded to political pressures."'281
A majority of the Court no longer saw the evils incumbent in enforcing
the constitutional principles of federalism and limited and enumerated
powers as less malevolent than the evils that would accompany granting
Congress unchecked authority to legislate pursuant to the Commerce
Clause.
It was clear that the Supreme Court was curtailing meaningful re-
view of Congress's commerce power in 1937 with its decision in NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.282 At issue in Jones & Laughlin was the
constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).283  The
NLRA granted the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) broad regu-
latory authority over labor relations in any enterprise receiving a substan-
tial part of its material from, or shipping a substantial part of its products
in, interstate commerce and dependent upon such commerce for the suc-
cessful conduct of its business. 284 Congress deemed the law necessary to
alleviate the "paralyzing consequences" of industrial strife.285 The
NLRB was attempting to sanction the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corpora-
tion for violating a provision in the Act that prevented employers from
firing union organizers and other pro-union workers. 286 Jones & Laugh-
lin attempted to avoid the sanction by having the NLRA invalidated as
beyond Congress's commerce power.
Under the Court's existing framework for analyzing statutes enacted
under the commerce power, the NLRA fell under the facet concerning
regulation of local activities unrelated to the instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce. Therefore, the parties expected the Court to apply the
280 4 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLim D. ROOSEVELT 212, 297-98
(1938) (Letter from President Franklin Roosevelt to Congressman Hill, chairmen of the House
committee in which the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 was pending, urging the
Congressman to support the bill and ignore arguments regarding doubts as to the constitution-
ality of the Act).
Emboldened by his landslide re-election in 1936, President Roosevelt publicly questioned
the Court's role as arbiter of the Constitution declaring "we must take action to save the
Constitution from the Court .... We cannot rely on an amendment as the immediate or only
answer to our present difficulties. [An] amendment like the rest of the Constitution is what the
Justices say it is rather than what.., you might hope it is." President Franklin D. Roosevelt in
his Weekly Radio Address to the Nation (Mar. 9, 1937), reprinted in GUNrHER, supra note
181, at 123.
281 TRIE, supra note 167, § 5-4 at 309.
282 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
283 Id. at 29-30.
284 Id. at 22-25.
285 Id. at 41.
286 Id. at 24-25.
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indirect/direct test.2 87 The Court did not, however, subject the NLRA to
this test. Instead, it used the contextual and pragmatic "substantial rela-
tion" approach 2 88 it had previously applied exclusively to regulations af-
fecting the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.2 89  The Court
analogized the NLRA to the regulation upheld in The Shreveport Rate
Case290 on the basis that, in both cases, "the interstate and intrastate as-
pects of commerce were so mingled together that full regulation of inter-
state commerce required incidental regulation of intrastate
commerce." 29 1 The Court concluded that because the regulation bore a
"close and substantial relation to interstate commerce [the regulation is)
within the reach of federal power.., although the industry when sepa-
rately viewed is local."'292 Consequently, the NLRA was upheld.293 The
Laughlin Court did, however, warn that:294
Undoubtedly the scope of [the commerce] power must
be considered in the light of our dual system of govern-
ment and may not be extended so as to embrace effects
upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to
embrace them, in view of our complex society, would ef-
fectually obliterate the distinction between what is na-
tional and what is local and create a completely
centralized government. The question is necessarily one
of degree.295
287 See supra Part IV.C.2.a.iii. The government's argument evidenced its belief that the
indirectldirect test would be applied. The government argued that cases in which legislation
was invalidated because it regulated matters only indirectly affecting interstate commerce were
inapplicable in this case because the labor disruptions the NLRA sought to regulate and pre-
vent "constitute[d] an interruption to commerce operating directly without an 'efficient inter-
vening agency or condition."' NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 11 (1937).
288 "The case that seems to mark the Court's definitive commitment to the practical con-
ception of the commerce power is NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp." United States v.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1636 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
289 301 U.S. at 36-38. The Court repeatedly cites "affecting instrumentalities of commerce
cases" which sprang from the Shreveport Rate Case. See supra Part IV.C.2.a.iii.
290 This was a seminal decision in the cases creating the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce facet of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See supra Part IV.C.2.a.iii.
291 Houston & Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351-52 (1914).
292 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1937).
293 Id. at 49.
294 The court stated:
[There is a] limitation upon the federal power which inheres in the constitutional
grain, as well as because of the explicit reservation of the Tenth Amendment. The
authority of the federal government may not be pushed to such an extreme as to
destroy the distinction, which the Commerce Clause itself establishes, between com-
merce "among the several States" and internal concerns of a State. That distinction
between what is national and what is local in the activities of commerce is vital to
the maintenance of our federal system.
Id. at 30.
295 Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
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After Jones & Laughlin, the Court continued to apply the "substan-
tial relation" test developed to assess regulations affecting the instrumen-
talities of interstate commerce (i.e., ships, railroads, and automobiles) to
regulations affecting local activities unrelated to instrumentalities of in-
terstate commerce. 296 Eventually, the vague indirect/direct distinction
withered from disuse.297 In 1941, the Court made clear that it had united
all three heads of the commerce power under the pragmatic and context-
specific "substantial relation" test298 in United States v. Darby.299
Darby upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).A°° The Act
prohibited placing into interstate commerce goods manufactured by labor
paid below a prescribed minimum wage.30 Under the Court's pre-1937
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the FLSA appeared to be a regulation
intended to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral
and injurious uses.302 The Court, however, did not apply the "goods
harmful in themselves" 30 3 test traditionally used in such cases. 3°4 This
test was expressly rejected?0 5 by the Darby Court. Citing Justice
Holmes's dissent in Hammer v. Dagenhart, the Court overruled Hammer
v. Dagenhart30 6 and applied a " substantial effect" test.307
The opinion proceeded to plow more new ground when it emascu-
lated the Tenth Amendment by declaring it a mere "truism," thereby re-
moving an obstacle in the path of the accreting commerce power.308
With the Tenth Amendment rendered impotent, the only limitations left
upon Congress's ability to regulate private actors under the commerce
power inhered in the Constitution's structure,309 which delegated "few
296 After Laughlin, the Court constantly applied the "affecting interstate commerce test"
to all three facets of the commerce power. See, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power
Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940) (upholding regulation of electrical production facilities); United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding federal statute prohibiting inter-
state shipment of filled milk).
297 TRIBE, supra note 167, § 5-4, at 308-09.
298 See JAMEs AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONsTrrTUTONAL DMocRAcY 161-64
(1984).
299 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
300 Id. at 111-12, 115.
301 Id. at 112.
302 Id. at 116.
303 Id.
304 See supra Part IV.C.2.a.ii.
305 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 117 (1941).
306 Id. at 116-17. For a more complete description of the Dagenhart case, see supra Part
IV.C.2.a.ii.
307 Id. at 119.
308 Our conclusion is unaffected by the Tenth Amendment which provides: 'The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people'. The amendment
states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.
Id. at 123-24.
309 See Redish & Drizin, supra note 211, at 1-5.
19971
794 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 6:753
and defined" 3 10 powers to the federal government and created a federal
system of dual sovereignty. 3 11 One year after Darby,3 12 it became clear
in the case of Wickard v. Filburn13 that the Court was no longer enforc-
ing these remaining structural limitations on the power of the national
government. 3 14
Wickard upheld amendments to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938 penalizing wheat production in excess of government quotas, even
if it was grown for home consumption.315 The opinion noted that the
rationale of Darby, permitting regulation of matters having a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce, may not be broad enough to
cover "production not intended in any part for commerce but wholly for
consumption on the farm. '316 So, to further develop "[a] practical con-
ception of commercial regulation,"3 17 the Court expanded the commerce
power to permit regulation of private activities "[which] may not be re-
garded as commerce... whatever [their] nature, '318 so long as the activi-
ties "might reasonably be deemed nationally significant in their
aggregate economic effect. ' 319 The aggregative test articulated in Wick-
ard was soon "understood to provide no limitation on the power [of Con-
gress to legislate under the Commerce Clause]. ' '32 °
After Wickard, the Court maintained a tripartite conception of the
commerce power,321 but applied a single "test" to determine whether an
act of Congress exceeded the scope of a particular facet of the commerce
power. This single test evolved into an even more permissive standard
than the "cumulative effects" test articulated by the Wickard Court.
Eventually, the "test" became a rubber stamp because the Court simply
310 THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
311 In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is
first divided between two distinct [and separate] governments, and then the portion
allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a
double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will
control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.
TiH FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
312 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
313 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
314 See, e.g., GUNTHER, supra note 181, at 131 ("in effect [the Wickard Court] aban-
don[ed] all judicial concern with federalistic limits on congressional power" to regulate private
actors); Redish & Drizin, supra note 211, at 4 & n.13.
315 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114-20.
316 Id. at 118-19.
317 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1637 (1995) (Kennedy, J. concurring).
318 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
319 TRIBE, supra note 167, § 5-4, at 310 (explaining the holding and rationale of the Wick-
ard decision).
320 Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 81, 81-82
n.3 (1982).
321 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629 (1995); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1981); Perez v. United States,
402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (all stating that there are three facets of the commerce power).
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had to find that "Congress had a rational basis for finding that [an activ-
ity] ... affected commerce. '322 By its plain meaning, this standard is
incredibly broad because "depending upon the level of generality, any
activity can be looked upon as commercial." 323 Furthermore, simply
asking whether Congress had a rational basis is a rhetorical question be-
cause "one always can" find a rational basis.324 This is especially so
when the Court is willing "to accept Congress's word on a statute's con-
nection to interstate commerce," 325 as it did after Wickard.326 Even
when Congress neglected the formality of making findings as to how an
activity related to interstate commerce, under this "standard" the Court
imputed a rational basis to Congress's actions. 327 Quite simply, this
standard allowed Congress "[to] sit in final judgement on the constitu-
tionality of their own actions. ' 328 Consequently, it also amounted to ju-
dicial abdication of the Court's duty to enforce the limitations on federal
power inherent in the structure and text of the Constitution 329 by provid-
ing meaningful review to congressional regulation of private activity pre-
mised upon the commerce power.
c. Complete Abdication Ends: United States v. Lopez
Over the years, voices expressed concern over the Court's abdica-
tion of meaningful review of Commerce Clause enactments. 330 Never-
theless, waves of legislation premised upon the commerce power331
322 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (upholding
Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act which was enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause).
323 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1633 (1995).
324 Joseph Calve, Anatomy of a Landmark Ruling, LEGAL TIMEs, Aug. 14, 1995 at 9
(quoting Scalia, J., during oral argument for United States v. Lopez 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995)).
325 Id.
326 For instances where the Court has accepted, at face value, Congressional findings
concerning an activity's connection to interstate commerce see, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264 (1981) ("The Court must defer to a congressional
finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce.") (emphasis added); Perez v.
United States 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
327 See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971) (asserting Congress need
not "make particularized findings in order to legislate [under the Commerce Clause]").
328 Redish & Drizin, supra note 211, at 16.
329 See id. at 15-17.
330 See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
311 (1981) ("[S]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially
affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.") (Rehnquist, J., concurring);
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,273 (1964) ("[W]hether particular
operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of
Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question.") (Black,
J., concurring).
331 The wave of Commerce Clause legislation became a tsunami under the Bush and
Clinton administrations as the Executive and Legislative branches got "tough on crime" and
passed reams of new federal criminal legislation. These statutes, premised upon the commerce
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continued to erode "the distinction between what is national and what is
local. '332 The echo of the Jones & Laughlin Court's warning that "the
scope of th[e] [commerce] power must be considered in light of our dual
system of government, '333 did not resonate with a majority of the Court
until fifty-eight years after it was given. Once again, a majority of the
Court viewed any evils flowing from fulfilling its duty to honor the con-
stitutional values of federalism and limited and enumerated powers as
less malevolent than allowing Congress unlimited power to legislate pur-
suant to the Commerce Clause. 334 In United States v. Lopez,335 this ma-
jority took action before the tide of Commerce Clause legislation
engulfed one of the last elements defining the distinction between what is
national and what is local-education.336
In Lopez, the Supreme Court finally began to delineate substantive
limits on the commerce power337 by declaring the Gun Free School
Zones Act (GFSZA) unconstitutional because it was beyond Congress's
commerce power to enact.338 The Lopez majority's 339 decision did not
rest on Congress's failure to observe the formality of making legislative
findings connecting the enactment to interstate commerce.340 It resulted
instead from an acute fear that upholding the GFSZA and the attenuated
causal chain which connected it to interstate commerce would effectively
power, covered matters ranging from liberation of research animals (18 U.S.C. § 43 (1993)) to
the theft of artwork (18 U.S.C. § 668 (1994)) to possession of a handgun by a juvenile (18
U.S.C. § 922(x)(1) (1994)). Thanks in large part to the Violent Crime Control and Law En-
forcement Act of 1994, the number of federal crimes created via the Commerce Clause has
risen to over 3,000. See generally Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Princi-
ples to Define the Proper Limits For Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979
(1995); Mengler, supra note 27 (both recounting the massive increase in federal criminal laws
enacted under the commerce power in recent years and the negative effects this trend has had
on the federal courts).
332 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
333 Id.
334 See Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1787, 1816 (1995).
335 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1633 (1995). For a thorough discussion of
the facts of Lopez see supra Part II.B.
336 Although Congress has passed legislation pertaining to education, it has done so under
the Spending Clause. When Congress initiates legislation under its spending power, it is not
invading the domain of states because states may opt out of the program at the risk of losing
federal funds. States have no such discretion when a statute is premised upon the commerce
power. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987). But see Joshua Kaden, Politics,
Money and State Sovereignty, 79 COLUm. L. REv. 847 (1979) (arguing that opting out of
federal programs and foregoing federal monies is no longer a realistic option).
337 See Dailey, supra note 334, at 1816.
338 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633 (1995).
339 Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the Court in which Justices Scalia, Thomas,
O'Connor and Kennedy joined. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion
and Justice Thomas also wrote a separate concurrence.
340 See, e.g., Harvey Berkman, Second Commerce Clause Ruling Calms the Waters,
NAT'L L.J., May 15, 1995, at A7 (quoting Lawrence H. Tribe, "Congress made no effort to
connect what it was doing to interstate activity or commerce").
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"obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and
create a completely centralized government."' 341 Having recognized that
"the basic constitutional 'test' of whether or not Congress had a rational
basis for believing a regulation affected commerce provide[d] no limita-
tion upon federal power,"342 the Court began laying the foundation for a
"line of constitutional defense against federal overreaching," 343 by de-
marcating an "enclave of 'local affairs' committed... to state regula-
tion."344 Courts that have heard challenges to the CSRA do not appear to
understand the guidance the Lopez majority gave for assessing when a
Commerce Clause enactment constitutes unconstitutional federal over-
reaching on the post-Lopez map of the federal balance.
3. Judicial Review in the Post-Lopez Era: Deciphering Lopez
Some courts striking down the CSRA have apparently interpreted
Lopez as "the first drops of a coming storm of judicial activism '345 to
correct the "wrong turn" 346 taken in Commerce Clause jurisprudence
341 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). During oral argument
the Court showed little concern for the lack of congressional findings but repeatedly expressed
concern that "if [possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school] is covered [under the
Commerce Clause] what is there that Congress cannot do under this rubric?" Transcript at 5
(O'Connor, J.). "Is there any stopping point?" Transcript at 10 (Scalia, J.).
Are we left with the proposition, then, that it is for Congress, not the Court to pre-
serve the Federal structure? ... But with reference to the commerce point, realisti-
cally, that's where we are. None of us at least, can think of anything under our
present case law, or at least under [the Government's argument], that Congress can't
do if it chooses under the Commerce Clause, so if the Federal system must be pre-
served by someone, and the Commerce Clause is a means by which the Federal
structure can be obliterated, and if we have no tools or analytic techniques to make
these distinctions then it follows that the Federal balance is remitted to the judge-
ment of Congress .... If that's the test, it's all over.
Transcript at 18-19 (Kennedy, J.).
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy was refreshingly candid when he noted that Congress
has:
[T]he sworn obligation to preserve and protect the Constitution in maintaining the
federal balance .... At the same time, the absence of structural mechanisms to
require those officials to undertake this principled task, and the momentary political
convenience often attendant upon their failure to do so, argue against the complete
renunciation of the judicial role .... The federal balance is too essential a part of our
constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit
inability to intervene when one or the other levels of government has tipped the
scales too far.
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1639 (1995).
342 Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value, 1981 Sup. CT. Rv. 81, 81 n.3.
(1982).
343 John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REV. 693, 701 (1971).
344 Id.
345 Harvey Berkman, Second Commerce Clause Ruling Calms the Waters, NAT'L L.J.,
May 15, 1995, at A7.
346 United States v. Lopez, 15 S. Ct. 1624, 1649 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing
that the Commerce Clause jurisprudence which developed during the New Deal was a radical
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during the New Deal. Courts so interpreting Lopez, however, are mis-
construing the opinion. The holding was "necessary though limited"347
because it was a defensive measure to: (1) re-establish that the Constitu-
tion mandates a federal system with a national government of limited and
enumerated powers, and (2) preserve the islands of state authority which
have not yet been engulfed by congressional enactments premised upon
the commerce power. Both the majority opinion and the concurrences
made clear that the Court was not going on the offensive to regain any of
the territory the federal government had wrested from the states during
the nearly sixty years in which the Court granted Congress plenary au-
thority to regulate private conduct under the guise of regulating com-
merce.348 Thus, Lopez signifies the Court's determination to consider
the scope of the commerce power "in light of our dual system of govern-
ment," as of 1995, so as to prevent Congress from "effectually ob-
literat[ing] the [remaining] distinction between what is national and what
is local."'349
Few federal judges have understood this subtle but important
message. One that has, however, recently articulated his view of the im-
plications this message has for federal courts reviewing Commerce
Clause legislation. In United States v. Wall, Judge Danny J. Boggs of the
Sixth Circuit explains how federal courts should assess whether a Com-
merce Clause enactment constitutes unconstitutional federal overreach-
departure from precedent and makes the majority of Article I of the Constitution "mere
surplussage").
347 United States v, Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
348 Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion rationalized even the most controversial exer-
cises of the commerce power during the era of abdication, such as the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628-30. The majority opinion, however, also said:
To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon
inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.
Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, giving
great deference to congressional action. The broad language in these opinions has
suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any
further. To do so would require us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration
of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated, and that there never will
be a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local. This we are
unwilling to do.
Id. at 1634 (emphasis added).
The Kennedy/O'Connor concurrence discussed stare decisis considerations that precluded
disturbing the "Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it has evolved to this point." Id. at 1637.
Justice Thomas's concurrence pointed out that existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence was
"far removed from both the Constitution and the [Court's] early case law." Nevertheless, he
conceded that "it is too late in the day to undertake a fundamental reexamination of the past 60
years. Considerations of stare decisis and reliance interests may convince us that we cannot
wipe the slate clean." Id. at 1650.
349 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628-29 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
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ing in the post-Lopez era.350 The analysis of this Note posits that Judge
Boggs has slightly misconstrued the message and spirit of Lopez, but is
much closer to the mark than most of the federal bench. Briefly articu-
lating Judge Boggs's analysis will help illustrate this Note's view of
proper post-Lopez analysis by providing a basis of comparison that in
most respects accurately translates Lopez.
Judge Boggs's analysis correctly assumes that "Lopez means some-
thing and is not simply an aberration designed to strike down one stat-
ute. ' 3 5 1 His analysis honors the analytic implications of Lopez by
requiring the placement of a Commerce Clause enactment under one of
the three facets of the commerce power recognized in Lopez:
(1) regulations affecting "the use of the channels of in-
terstate commerce,"
(2) regulations that "protect the instrumentalities of in-
terstate commerce, or persons, or things in interstate
commerce," and
(3) regulation of "those activities having a substantial re-
lation to interstate commerce. '352
Judge Boggs's analysis further tracks Lopez by requiring enactments fall-
ing under the third prong to survive three additional inquiries as to
whether:
(a) the regulation controls a commercial activity or an
activity necessary to the regulation of some commercial
activity,
(b) the statute includes a jurisdictional nexus require-
ment to ensure that each regulated instance of the activ-
ity affects interstate commerce, and
(c) the rationale offered to support the constitutionality
of the statute (i.e., statutory findings, legislative history,
arguments of counsel, or a reviewing court's own attri-
bution of purposes to the statute being challenged) has a
logical stopping point, so that the rationale is not so
broad as to regulate on a similar basis all human en-
deavors, especially those traditionally regulated by the
states.353
Judge Boggs also astutely notes that, in Lopez, the Court did not apply
rational basis scrutiny. He apparently interpreted this to mean that all
350 United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d, 1444, 1454 (6th Cir. 1996) (Boggs, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
351 Id. at 1455.
352 See id. at 1455-56 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629-30 (1995)).
353 Id. (quoting Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-33).
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post-Lopez Commerce Clause review was to be performed pursuant to
"the type of intermediate scrutiny used in Lopez. 354
In the course of applying his post-Lopez analysis in Wall to the fed-
eral Illegal Gambling Business Statute,355 which was categorized under
the substantial effects prong of Lopez, Judge Boggs reached the conclu-
sion that the Act was unconstitutional. This was because the proffered
rationale for the statute had no logical stopping point. This, of course,
meant that the enactment failed the third part of the inquiry required for
statutes classified under the "substantial effects" prong.356
In Wall, Judge Boggs came very close to stating with perfect accu-
racy the analytic process Lopez commands federal courts to undertake in
assessing the validity of Commerce Clause enactments. His analysis,
however, goes both too far and not far enough in certain respects. It goes
too far in asserting that the intermediate scrutiny applied in Lopez must
now be applied to all exercises of the commerce power. Such an asser-
tion fails to recognize the extent to which the holding in Lopez was "nec-
essary though limited. ' 357 The Lopez majority was merely trying to
revive what was left of the unique constitutional principles of federalism
and limited and enumerated powers.358 Remember, both the majority
opinion and the concurrences made clear that the Court was not going on
the offensive to roll back the commerce power that developed in the
years prior to Lopez.359 Applying intermediate scrutiny to all Commerce
Clause enactments would be contrary to the Lopez majority's determina-
tion to consider the scope of the Commerce Clause "in the light of our
dual system of government" as of 1995 in order to prevent Congress
from "effectually obliterat[ing] the [remaining] distinction between what
is national and what is local. '360 To ensure that courts act only defen-
sively to prevent further expansion of the commerce power at the ex-
pense of federalism, Lopez commands intermediate scrutiny only for
354 Id. at 1460.
355 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994).
356 Id. at 1467.
357 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (Kennedy, J. concurring).
358 BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 195-
233 (1967) (describing the Framers' ideas of divided sovereignty and enumerated powers as
"radical").
359 See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
Five days after Lopez, the Court made good on its implicit promise to refrain from ousting
the federal government from territory it had already claimed under the commerce power in
United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732 (1995).
360 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). The Lopez majority
cited this language. 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1628-29 (1995).
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Commerce Clause enactments implicating "paradigmatic examples of
state authority," 361 e.g., education and family law.362
This conclusion is supported by the observation that the Court
clearly did not apply the intermediate scrutiny used in Lopez when it
decided United States v. Robertson363 two days after Lopez. In Robert-
son, the Court summarily dismissed arguments that the defendant was
not "engaged in or affecting interstate commerce" after noting that while
residing in Arizona he had purchased a goldmine in Alaska, hired and
transported workers from outside Alaska to operate the mine, and trans-
ported some $30,000 worth of gold out of Alaska. 364 The cursory review
applied in Robertson, coupled with the Lopez majority's concern for
"paradigmatic examples of state authority,"365 indicate that congressional
actions premised upon the Commerce Clause will be subjected to inter-
mediate scrutiny only if the measure on its face threatens an expansion of
the commerce power into remaining areas of traditional state concern.366
As the Second Circuit noted: Lopez "revealed the Court's willingness to
give serious and renewed thought to issues of federalism at the founda-
tion of our constitutional system." 367 It makes sense, however, to infer
that the Court will only risk the inevitable criticism that will follow from
seriously second-guessing Congress and possibly striking down meas-
ures that facilitate noble policy goals, such as reducing violence in
schools, only when doing so promotes important countervailing constitu-
tional values at the foundation of our constitutional system, such as the
remnants of federalism.
While Judge Boggs's analysis goes too far in implying that interme-
diate scrutiny will be applied to review of all Commerce Clause enact-
ments, it does not go far enough in assessing the implications of applying
intermediate scrutiny when it is warranted. Judge Boggs does recognize
the implications of intermediate scrutiny as to the application of the
"substantial effects" prong of Lopez by stating that enactments seeking to
be justified under this prong must satisfy all three of the additional in-
quiries he correctly attributes to this facet of the commerce power.368 He
does not, however, directly recognize the implications that intermediate
scrutiny has on applying the other two facets of the commerce power
361 See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-33, 1640, 1642.
362 The majority'and both concurring opinions mentioned these as areas of traditional
state concern. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630-33, 1640, 1642 (1995).
363 514 U.S. 669 (1995) (per curiam).
364 Id. at 669.
365 Lopez 115 S. Ct. at 1630-33, 1640, 1642.
366 See id. at 1634, 1640.
367 United States v. All Assets of G.P.S. Automotive Corp., 66 F.3d 483, 499 (2d Cir.
1995).
368 See United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1460-61 (1996).
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recognized in Lopez.369 Of course, it was not necessary for Judge Boggs
to discuss these facets because the government conceded that the statute
at issue in Wall could only be defended under the substantial effects
prong. 370 Nevertheless, it is important to understand how intermediate
scrutiny will effect the application of the other two prongs of the com-
merce power.
Lopez itself provides insight into this inquiry. The Lopez majority
acknowledged that many decisions of the Court during the abdication era
went a long way toward converting the commerce power into "a general
police power of the sort retained by the states" and that "[t]he broad
language of these opinions suggested the possibility of additional expan-
sion. '371 They refused "to proceed any further," however, because they
were unwilling to further erode the "distinction between what is truly
national and what is truly local. ' 372 This adamant refusal to expand the
scope of abdication-era Commerce Clause precedents to justify statutes
that implicate areas of traditional state concern is important. It implies
that the Court will not sanction applications of the first two facets of the
commerce power which are so fast and loose that any statute can be
placed under them as opposed to the more demanding third prong.
For example, if the GFSZA at issue in Lopez had contained a juris-
dictional nexus requirement making it a crime to possess on a school
campus a firearm that had moved in interstate commerce, then under
intermediate scrutiny the Court would not have allowed the GFSZA to be
classified as a regulation of things (firearms) in interstate commerce, de-
spite the fact that at some level of abstraction the statute was indeed such
a regulation. This analysis could not be permitted because the logical
result of allowing such fast and loose categorization would be that a posi-
tive response to the jurisdictional nexus inquiry under the substantial re-
lation prong would prove that the initial classification of the GFSZA
under that prong was improper. The entire jurisdictional nexus inquiry
would be question begging.
Depending upon the level of generality employed, any activity
could be said to involve a "thing" that moved in interstate commerce. A
court that refuses "to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of
powers does not presuppose something not enumerated and that there
never will be a distinction between what is truly national and what is
truly local" is unlikely to sanction reasoning that would permit such a
simple end run around its efforts to prevent such a state of affairs. 373
369 See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30.
370 See Wall, 92 F.3d at 1460.
371 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
372 Id.
373 Id.
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Therefore, -it is implicit in Lopez that the Court will not permit Com-
merce Clause enactments triggering intermediate scrutiny to be stealthily
sheltered under the first two prongs unless it can be placed there under a
narrow reading of abdication-era precedent. In this vein, the Court will
likely also refuse to extend by artful analogy the reasoning of broadly
phrased abdication era precedents. Admittedly, the question of whether a
new enactment falls within the zone created by a narrow reading of
precedents under the first two facets of the commerce power "is neces-
sarily one of degree," 374 but it is still clear that the outer limit will not be
stretched as far as the language of abdication-era precedents imply it
might.
From this discussion, a clear picture of post-Lopez analysis consis-
tent with the words and spirit of the majority opinion emerges. This
analysis requires a court to first ask if a Commerce Clause enactment
implicates a paradigmatic example of traditional state concern, e.g, edu-
cation, family law, or criminal law.375 If this inquiry is answered affirm-
atively, the court is then required to apply intermediate scrutiny rather
than rational basis review.376 This intermediate scrutiny requires, (1)
that the court not defer to Congress's assessment of an activity's connec-
tion to interstate commerce, as it does under rational basis scrutiny; and
(2) that the court should read precedents under each prong of the com-
merce power recognized in Lopez conservatively and refuse to expand
upon precedents from the era of abdication. If an enactment falls under
the "substantially affecting" commerce prong of Lopez then it must sur-
vive each of the following additional inquiries as to whether:
(a) the regulation controls a commercial activity or an
activity necessary to the regulation of some commercial
activity,
(b) the statute includes a jurisdictional nexus require-
ment to ensure that each regulated instance of the activ-
ity affects interstate commerce, and
(c) the rationale offered to support the constitutionality
of the statute (i.e., statutory findings, legislative history,
arguments of counsel, or a reviewing court's own attri-
bution of purposes to the statute being challenged) has a
logical stopping point, so that the rationale is not so
374 Id. at 1633.
375 See id. at 1632.
376 See, e.g., id. at 1653-54 (Souter, J., dissenting) (objecting to the fact the majority was
not using rational basis review); United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1459 (6th Cir. 1996)
(Boggs, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reading Lopez "as requiring more than
mere rational basis scrutiny); Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce
Clause, 71 NoTRE DAm L. REv. 167, 177 (1996) (explaining that Lopez majority heightened
the level of scrutiny "from rational basis ... to intermediate scrutiny").
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broad as to regulate on a similar basis all human endeav-
ors, especially those traditionally regulated by the
states.3
77
Most federal courts that have heard challenges to the CSRA have
failed to apply this analysis and have clearly disregarded the message of
the Lopez majority. This is evident when the opinions of the courts that
have upheld the CSRA are analyzed against the above reading of Lopez.
4. Applying post-Lopez Analysis to the CSRA
a. Appropriate Level of Scrutiny
Courts scrutinizing the CSRA in a manner consistent with the text
and spirit of the Lopez opinion should apply the same intermediate scru-
tiny applied to the GFSZA in Lopez. This is because, like the GFSZA,
the CSRA on its face represents federal regulation involving two areas of
traditional state concern-family law and criminal law.378 Many courts
have erred by applying rational basis scrutiny.37 9 Once a court comply-
ing with Lopez correctly concludes that it must apply intermediate scru-
tiny, it must then proceed to classify the CSRA under one of the three
prongs of the commerce power recognized in Lopez.
b. Classifying the CSRA
i. Regulating the Use of the Channels of Interstate Commerce
Prong
Some courts380 have erroneously attempted to categorize the CSRA
under the first facet of the commerce power recognized in Lopez, which
permits Congress to "regulate the use of the channels of interstate com-
merce. '3 1 First of all, the precedents cited by the Supreme Court and
other courts for this facet of the commerce power either attach conditions
to the use of the channels of interstate commerce or prohibit the use of
377 Wall, 92 F.3d at 1455-56 (quoting Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1629-33).
378 The CSRA deals with criminal sanctions for failing to make child support payments.
Family law is traditionally viewed as encompassing marriage, divorce, child custody, child
support, alimony, property division, termination of parental rights, adoption and foster care.
See, Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1632 (stating family law, education and criminal law are areas "where
States have historically been sovereign."); see also Dailey, supra note 334, at 1792.
379 See, e.g., United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1001-02 (10th Cir. 1996) (rejecting
Lopez challenge after applying rational basis review); United States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp.
1093, 1096 (D.R.I. 1996) (applying rational basis review and rejecting Lopez challenge);
United States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying rational basis and
rejecting Lopez challenge).
380 See, e.g., Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 313-14.
381 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629.
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the channels of interstate commerce. 382 None of these precedents sup-
port a congressional power to force a party refusing to use the channels
of interstate commerce to do so. This facet presupposes a party is using
the channels of interstate commerce. Therefore, it would apply if the
CSRA prohibited the use of the channels of interstate commerce to will-
fully avoid making child support payments. Instead, the CSRA criminal-
izes the failure to use the channels of interstate commerce to pay child
support.
A hypothetical example based upon the famous case of Wickard v.
Filburn illustrates why a conception of this facet of the commerce power
broad enough to encompass the CSRA should be rejected after Lopez.
Suppose that, instead of trying to keep wheat prices up by restricting the
supply of wheat, Congress enacted a law to lower the price of wheat by
requiring that half of all arable land be used to produce wheat and further
requiring: (1) that all wheat be placed in interstate commerce; and (2)
that all farmers are prohibited from keeping (hoarding) any wheat. The
logic that would permit the CSRA to fall under this first facet of the
commerce power would also permit Congress to enact this hypothetical
law under this facet. After all, the regulation is triggered only after will-
ful failure to comply with a legal obligation that requires the party to
engage in interstate commerce. Furthermore, the willful failure to place
the wheat in interstate commerce represents an immoral and injurious
failure to use the channels of interstate commerce.383 Clearly this would
mean conceding that the "use" of the channels of interstate commerce
prong swallowed the activities substantially affecting interstate com-
merce prong under which Wickard was justified. There is nothing to
indicate that the Supreme Court intended any of the three prongs of the
commerce power to be superfluous. Under intermediate scrutiny, the
Court will not tolerate such a fast and loose application of the three fac-
ets of the commerce power,384 especially when doing so results in such
382 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (uphold-
ing statute keeping the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious use as
a means of imposing racial segregation); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (up-
holding statute regulating the use of the channels of interstate commerce to transport women
for immoral purposes); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding statute
prohibiting the use of the channels of interstate commerce as the instrument of "the distribu-
tion of goods produced under substandard labor conditions"); United States v. Hill, 248 U.S.
420 (1919) (upholding statute regulating the use of the channels of interstate commerce to
transport liquor); Hoke & Economides v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding stat-
ute prohibiting the use of the channels of interstate commerce to transport women for prostitu-
tion); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (upholding statute prohibiting the
use of the channels of interstate commerce to transport impure food and drugs); Champion v.
Ames 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding statute prohibiting the use of interstate commerce to
transport lottery tickets across state lines).
383 See Nichols, 938 F. Supp. at 314 (applying identical reasoning).
384 See supra Part IV.C.3 (on deciphering Lopez).
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perverse results. Courts classifying the CSRA under this prong have
either grievously misread Lopez or have engaged in wishful thinking.
ii. Regulating Instrumentalities, Persons, or Things in
Interstate Commerce
Many courts have classified the CSRA under the second prong of
the commerce power recognized in Lopez: "regulat[ing] and protect[ing]
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in inter-
state commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate
activities. '385 The most articulate and formidable argument for placing
the CSRA under this prong was made by the Second Circuit in United
States v. Sage386 which merits closer scrutiny.
The Sage Court's reasoning may be summarized as follows: (1) Lo-
pez says that Congress may "regulate and protect the instrumentalities of,
or persons or things in interstate commerce;' 387 (2) in CSRA cases we
have a thing-an obligation to pay child support;388 (3) this thing is "in
commerce" for purposes of the Commerce Clause based on precedents
defining "commerce among the several States. 389
In Sage, the Second Circuit was quite correct to assume that a ruling
reversing existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence could not be sup-
ported by Lopez.390 The Sage Court erred, however, in two important
respects. First, it erred in its reading of precedent. Second, contrary to
the spirit of post-Lopez intermediate scrutiny, it construed precedent as
liberally as it might have during the era of abdication. Essentially, the
Sage Court attributed to existing precedent the assertion that any obliga-
tion that came to entail transferring money across state lines, for
whatever purpose, was subject to Congressional regulation under the
Commerce Clause.3 91 It relied upon two precedents for this conclu-
sion-Gibbons v. Ogden392 and United States v. South-Eastern Under-
writers Assoc. 393 The Sage Court misconstrued and expanded upon these
precedents.
385 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629. For cases classifying the CSRA under this prong see, e.g.,
United States v. Bongiorno, No. 96-1052, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2170, at *8-9 (lst Cir. Feb.
7, 1997); United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1002 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Mussari, 95 F.3d 789, 790 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir.
1996).
386 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996).
387 Id. at 106 (citing Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30).
388 Id. at 105.
389 Id. at 104-05.
390 See id.
391 See id. at 105-06.
392 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Discussed supra at Part IV.C.2.a.
393 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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The Sage Court accurately described Gibbons as defining commerce
more broadly than "traffic... buying, and selling or the interchange of
commodities. '394 The Sage Court was also accurate in noting that this
broader conception entailed "commercial intercourse between nations,
and parts of nations, in all its branches. '395 However, Gibbons further
held that Congress could only regulate commerce that "concerns more
states than one. '396 Given this definition of commerce by Justice Mar-
shall in Gibbons, the Supreme Court held that the Commerce Clause al-
lowed Congress to prescribe "rules for carrying on that intercourse." 397
These passages make clear that Justice Marshall was defining com-
merce that could be regulated under the Commerce Clause as traffic,
buying, selling, and the exchange of commodities, and also activities in-
cident to engaging in this commercial-type conduct-such as navigating
interstate waterways. He never held that any intercourse between the
states could be regulated pursuant to the Commerce Clause, but only
commercial intercourse. Marshall's words clearly imply that there is a
broad concept of intercourse and that commercial intercourse Congress
may regulate pursuant to its commerce power is a subcategory of, and
not'coextensive with, this broader category of intercourse. Dissociating
the word "intercourse" from the restrictive modifier "commercial" would
render the words "commercial" and "that" superfluous in the above state-
ments from Justice Marshall's opinion. The Sage Court abused and dis-
torted what Justice Marshall meant by commerce in the phrase
"commercial intercourse ... in all its branches" when it proclaimed that:
"this case involves matters that plainly meet John Marshall's definition
of commerce among the several States [because it] presupposes inter-
course, an obligation to pay money, and the intercourse concerns more
States than one."'398
Perhaps foreseeing the transparency of its sophistic assertion and
the resulting criticism, the Second Circuit attempted to justify this expan-
sion399 of Justice Marshall's definition of "commerce" by implying that
it was justified by a later precedent. Citing United States v. South-East-
ern Underwriters Ass'n.,400 the Sage Court declared that "sending money
to another State is commerce although the transaction does not 'concern
394 United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824)).
395 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189 (emphasis added).
396 Id. at 194.
397 Id. at 190 (emphasis added).
398 Sage, 92 F.3d at 105.
399 In his brilliant concurrence in Lopez, Justice Thomas thoroughly discredits the asser-
tion "that Gibbons 'described the federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded."
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1647 (quoting Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942)).
400 Sage, 92 F.3d at 105.
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the flow of anything more than electrons and information.' ",401 This
seems to imply that the Supreme Court has held that any transfer entail-
ing any form of transmission across state lines is in fact viewed by the
Court to be commerce for purposes of the Commerce Clause. Fairly
read, however, the precedent cited does not support such a broad
statement.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n involved an insurance conglom-
erate indicted under the Sherman Act for conspiring to restrain interstate
commerce "by fixing and maintaining arbitrary and non-competitive pre-
mium rates on fire ... insurance in" seven states.402 The case presented
the question of whether "fire insurance transactions which stretch across
state lines constitute 'Commerce among the several States' so as to make
them subject to regulation by Congress under the Commerce Clause. 40 3
In deciding whether South-Eastern Underwriters was engaged in inter-
state commerce, the Supreme Court stated that transactions across state
lines "may be commerce though they do not utilize common carriers or
concern the flow of anything more tangible than electrons and informa-
tion."4°4 The Court did not say that all such transactions are always in
fact commerce for purposes of the Commerce Clause. The Court went
on to say that, on the facts before them, the transactions South-Eastern
engaged in did constitute interstate commerce. This was because they
were "part of the conduct of a legitimate and useful commercial enter-
prise" and they entailed "integrated operations in many states and in-
volve[d] the transmission of great quantities of money, documents, and
communications across dozens of state lines. '405 The Court clearly at-
tributed great weight to not only the fact that South-Eastern was engaged
in affirmative conduct across state lines, but also to the fact that conduct
was incident to engaging in a commercial enterprise or business, as was
the navigation in Gibbons.40 6
Clearly, South-Eastern alone does not support the Second Circuit's
expansion of "commerce" to include the failure to meet an obligation to
send money for child support across state lines. It may not even support
the assertion that every instance of sending money across state lines to
pay child support constitutes commerce for purposes of the Commerce
Clause. Fairly read, the opinion stands for the proposition that conduct
consisting of transactions across state lines may place an individual or
entity "in commerce" for purposes of the Commerce Clause, when such
401 Id. at 106 (quoting United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533,
550 (1944)).
402 South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 535.
403 Id. at 538.
404 Id. at 549-50.
405 Id. at 550.
406 Id. at 540-46.
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conduct, no matter how trivial, is in furtherance of a commercial enter-
prise. And, as Judge Bechtle pointed out in United States v. Parker,
child support payments do not implicate "[a]rm's length commercial ac-
tors... [t]he marketplace for goods and services and prices of commodi-
ties are not affected at all." 407 Child support payments are simply in no
way incidental to a commercial enterprise in the way wiring actuarial
data across interstate telegraph lines is incidental to a commercial enter-
prise-i.e., the business of insurance. This view of South-Eastern is con-
sistent with the case law that the Lopez majority cites as representing the
basis of the second prong of the commerce power.40 8 It is also consistent
with the Lopez majority's refusal to further expand the commerce power
into areas of traditional state concern. The Second Circuit's effort to
classify the CSRA under this prong is a mistake because child support
payments are in no way associated with or incidental to a commercial
enterprise of the type implicated by other regulations classified under this
second prong of Lopez. The Sage Court's transformation of the second
facet of the commerce power into the "problems that defy local solu-
tion"40 9 prong represents a significant and novel expansion of this facet
of the commerce power. As such, it cannot survive under the intermedi-
ate scrutiny Lopez demands in CSRA cases.
in. Activities Substantially Affecting Interstate Commerce
As explained above, under existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence
viewed in a manner consistent with Lopez, the CSRA cannot be catego-
rized as a valid exercise of Congressional authority under either of the
first two facets of the commerce power recognized in Lopez. Many
courts hearing CSRA cases have realized this and attempted to classify
the CSRA as a regulation of an activity "having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce." 410 The courts have disagreed as to whether this
classification of the CSRA is permissible in light of Lopez.
407 United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 835 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (declaring the CSRA
unconstitutional).
408 See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629 (1995) (citing Shreveport Rate
Case, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)) (allowing Congress to regulate aspects of the interstate rail trans-
portation industry); Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) (allowing Congress
to regulate safety of vehicles used in interstate commerce related to the rail industry)).
409 Sage, 92 F.3d at 105.
410 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30. For cases attempting to so classify the CSRA, see, e.g.,
United States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1093, 1098-1100 (D.R.I. 1996) (upholding CSRA under
"substantial effects" prong); United States v. Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. 1076, 1082-83 (M.D.
Pa. 1996) (upholding CSRA under "substantial effects" prong); United States v. Kegel, 916 F.
Supp. 1233, 1237-39 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (upholding CSRA under "substantial effects" prong);
United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 834-43 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (declaring CSRA unconsti-
tutional after applying "substantial effects" prong).
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Applying the Lopez majority's tripartite inquiry recognized by
Judge Boggs as the prerequisite to properly classifying an enactment
under the "substantial effects" prong of the commerce power reveals that
Lopez does not sanction such a classification of the CSRA. The first step
in this inquiry entails asking whether the "regulation controls a commer-
cial activity or an activity necessary to the regulation of some commer-
cial activity."'41' As explained in the previous section, the payment of
child support is not "commerce" within the meaning ascribed to this term
in existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Lopez refused to expand
these precedents in cases such as this one where doing so would further
"obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local." 412
Nevertheless, the CSRA may survive under the second phrase of this first
sub-inquiry-"an activity necessary to the regulation of some commer-
cial activity."
The CSRA regulates the willful failure to pay child support for a
child residing in another state. The inquiry into whether this is "neces-
sary to some commercial activity," as that term was used by the Lopez
majority, can be assisted by reviewing the Lopez majority's discussion of
Wickard v. Filburn.413 Because post-Lopez analysis prohibits the exten-
sion of abdication-era Commerce Clause precedents, it is important to
note that the Court's discussion of Wickard was prefaced with the caveat
that the case was "the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause
authority. '414 The Court then observed that the grain allotments at issue
in Wickard involved "economic activity" subject to Commerce Clause
regulation. 415 This was because "one of the primary purposes of the Act
in question was to increase the market price of wheat and to that end to
limit the volume thereof that could affect the market. '416 The Court re-
fused to analogize from Wickard to cover the GFSZA under the "neces-
sary to the regulation of some commercial activity" caveat to the
substantial relation prong. This was because the GFSZA was a "criminal
statute that by its terms ha[d] nothing to do with 'commerce'." Why was
this so? and may the same be said of the CSRA?
The CSRA is like the GFSZA in that it is also a criminal statute.
Nevertheless, it seems more related to economic activity in one sense
discussed in Wickard because it criminalizes the failure to make a money
payment. Beyond this point the analogy to Wickard grows weaker. The
411 United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1455 (6th Cir. 1996) (Boggs, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citing Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629).
412 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 U.S. 1,
30 (1937)).
413 Id. at 1630.
414 Id.
415 Id.
416 Id. (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942)).
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conduct proscribed in Wickard-growing wheat for home consump-
tion-affected the wheat markets and the supply and demand of a com-
mercial commodity that was a subject of interstate commerce. Congress
was clearly attempting to regulate the supply and price of this commod-
ity. The conduct proscribed by the CSRA-failing to transfer funds to an
individual in another state-affects the economy by preventing a redistri-
bution of wealth. But this redistribution will not necessarily alter either
the supply or demand of any product or commodity that is a subject of
interstate commerce. Furthermore, it is not a necessary part of a plan by
Congress to regulate the supply or demand of a subject of interstate com-
merce. Similarly, the conduct proscribed by the GFSZA-possession of
a handgun on a school premises-could not be shown to affect the sup-
ply and demand of a particular subject of interstate commerce that Con-
gress was atte~npting to regulate.4 17
The foregoing analysis clarifies what constitutes "an activity neces-
sary to the regulation of some commercial activity." Under post-Lopez
intermediate scrutiny no Commerce Clause enactment can survive this
inquiry unless the government can demonstrate that the regulated con-
duct is on its face commercial, or necessary to regulate a commercial
activity in that it: (1) regulates human conduct that can be demonstrated
to effect the supply or demand of a specific subject of interstate com-
merce (e.g., wheat); and (2) Congress is attempting to regulate the sup-
ply, demand and/or price of that subject of interstate commerce. The
government cannot meet this burden with the CSRA. Therefore, the
CSRA cannot be classified as a regulation of an activity having a sub-
stantial affect on interstate commerce.
Furthermore, even if the CSRA passed this aspect of the substantial
relation test, it would fail the third prong of the substantial relation test
because the rationale connecting it to commerce relies upon the fact that
failure to pay child support affects federal monies.418 This rationale has
no logical stopping point. Under this rationale Congress's authority
under the Commerce Clause would be coextensive with its Spending
Clause419 authority. Congress could simply decide to expend funds on
education, and then any activity implicating those federal expenditures
could be regulated pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Given the fact that
Congress can spend money on anything that garners enough support to
417 In its substantial effects analysis, the Lopez majority explicitly noted that the GFSZA
was "not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity." Id.
418 See, e.g., United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1004 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that
the CSRA may be justified under the substantial relation prong of Lopez and citing to House
reports discussing the effects the failure to pay child support has on federal programs).
419 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (limiting appropriations only by the processual require-
ment that they be "made by Law" but providing no limitation as to the subject of
expenditures).
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enact an appropriations bill, 420 this rationale replicates the boundless
"cost of crime" theory rejected in Lopez.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the CSRA cannot be clas-
sified under either the channels of interstate commerce or the instrumen-
talities of interstate commerce prongs of the commerce power recognized
in Lopez. Nor can it survive the tripartite test for the substantial relation
prong of the post-Lopez Commerce Clause analysis. Therefore the
CSRA "'is invalid as beyond the power of Congress under the Com-
merce Clause."' 42 1
V. CONCLUSION
In the post-Lopez world, the CSRA must be sacrificed on the altar
of federalism. While this is understandably difficult for many to accept,
it must be remembered that just as releasing the poison-pedaling drug
dealer because his constitutional rights were violated 422 serves the higher
purpose of protecting individual liberty, so too does striking down the
CSRA to protect the federal structure. Federalism serves to prevent tyr-
anny and the loss of individual liberty that follows in its wake. Some-
times, to serve this noble purpose, federalism protects us from "our own
best intentions" by ensuring the division of "power among sover-
eigns ... so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in
one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day."'42 3 When
courts uphold the constitutional value of federalism against pleas of ne-
cessity they are simply heeding history's lesson that tyranny has most
often "grown out of power called for on pressing exigencies." 424 After
Lopez, it is also clear that federal courts invalidating the CSRA are hon-
oring a Constitutional command to avoid repeating this lesson of history
by giving meaningful review to Commerce Clause enactments implicat-
ing areas of traditional state concern.
Of course, it can only be expected that such pleas to a higher good
will sound hollow to those affected by deadbeat parents, just as pleas to a
higher good cannot be expected to resonate with the victims of the re-
leased criminal. It is also easy to see why lower federal courts might
allow their view of post-Lopez Commerce Clause analysis to be skewed
in favor of upholding the CSRA. It is undeniably distasteful and unpop-
ular to invalidate a law that discourages, or at least provides effective
420 Id.
421 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (quoting 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir.
1993).
422 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (throwing out confession of drug dealer
obtained in violation of Sixth Amendment).
423 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992).
424 THE FEDERALIST No. 20, at 136-37 (Alexander Hamilton & James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
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retribution against heartless, amoral, deadbeat parents who fail to honor
their legal obligation to support the children they brought into this world.
It is even more distasteful in an age when the federal government is feel-
ing the financial pinch and there is a very real danger that it will not be
able to continue to cover the shortfall between the amount of child sup-
port owed and the amount actually paid. Despite the sympathy this state
of affairs invites, the federal courts must not lose cite of the fact that the
primary issue in challenges to the constitutionality of the CSRA is not
the moral or legal obligation of a parent to support his child. "Rather, the
question to be addressed is the constitutional balance of federalism be-
tween the central government and the states as affected by the Commerce
Clause and recent pronouncements by the Supreme Court in relationship
thereto." 425
Despite the opinion of many lower federal courts to the contrary, a
thorough and objective review of the constitutional balance after Lopez
indicates that the CSRA is an invalid assertion of congressional authority
pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Courts failing to see this exemplify
the way "one falls so easily into thinking that because he would like to
get somewhere, he has arrived. '426 More importantly these courts defy
the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Lopez. And,
even if "practical politics consists in ignoring facts,"427 practical adjudi-
cation does not.
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